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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE*
William L. Prossert

N these days the ordinary legislature1 is likely to find on its calendar
a bill, sometimes approved and sponsored by the state bar association, which does away with contributory negligence as a complete
defense in any negligence action, and substitutes instead something
commonly miscalled "comparative negligence,"2 which involves some
method of dividing the damages between the parties. Such a bill is
of course no novelty, as the ample literature on the subject indicates.8

I

* This article is one of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered by Dean Prosser at
the University of Michigan Law School, February 2-6, 1953. The series, "Selected Topics
on the Law of Torts," will eventually be published in book form by the University of
Michigan Law School.-Ed.
t Boalt Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed.
1 "We understand that legislation of this type was introduced this year [1951) in the
following 16 states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah
and Washington." Lipscomb, "Comparative Negligence," lNs. L.J. No. 344, 667 at 674
(Sept. 1951).
2 "Comparative negligence" properly refers only to a comparison of the fault of the
plaintiff with that of the defendant. It does not necessarily result in any division of the
damages, but may permit full recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding his contributory
negligence. Traditionally, because of the origin of the term and its early history in Illinois (infra, text at notes 110-119), it has been associated with the idea of degrees of
negligence, and a comparison of "slight,'' "ordinary," and "gross." In the interest of clarity
the term should be avoided, and the statutes here in question should be called "damage apportionment" or "comparative damages" acts. See note, 12 CoRN. L.Q. 113 (1926). "Comparative negligence" is, however, in much too general use to permit much hope of its
elimination.
8 The classic article on the subject is Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative
Negligence," 17 CoRN. L.Q. 333, 604 (1932). Two recent discussions, both excellent and
exhaustive, are Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March,'' 28 Cm-Kmrr L. Rav. 189,
304 (1950), and Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases,'' 99 Umv. PA. L.
Rav. 572, 766 (1951). A very thorough study, going into all the complications, especially
of the multiple-party problem, is the book by Gregory, LEGLISLATIVE Loss DrsTRIBUTION
IN NEGLIGENCE AcnoNs (1936). See also Gregory, "Loss Distribution by Comparative
Negligence," 21 MINN. L. Rav. I (1936); Berg, "Comparative Negligence-A Substitute
for the Rule of Contributory Negligence,'' 9 S. D. B. J. 200 (1941); comment, 22 So.
CAL. L. Rav. 276 (1949). Numerous other articles bearing on particular statutes are cited
in the succeeding notes.
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Similar bills4 began to multiply in the legislatures during the decade
before the last war, when the pressure of the increasing automobile
accident rate compelled consideration of the problem of the uncompensated victim. It led even to proposals for an automobile accident
compensation plan, analogous to the workmen's compensation acts
and to be administered by some board or commission.5 In at least one
instance a "comparative negligence" act was adopted under threat
of such a compensation plan, and after a bill establishing it had passed
one house of the legislature at the preceding session. 6 During the
war, when gasoline rationing reduced the accident rate, the agitation
fell off; but with the slaughter on the highways resumed and accelerated, it has been revived in full vigor. A conservative prophet would
have no difficulty in predicting the adoption of damage apportionment
acts in several additional states within the next few years.
The United States is virtually the last stronghold of contributory
negligence. The last vestige of the complete defense disappeared long
since from all of continental Europe, which divides the darnages.7
4 In addition to the statutes adopted, the following unsuccessful bills have received
mention in print:
New York, 1930. See Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence,"
17 CoRN. L.Q. 333, 604 at 643 (1932); GREGORY, l.EGLisLATrvE Loss TuSTRIBtlTION IN
NEGLIGENCE AcnoNs 59 (1936).
Minnesota, 1940. See Pnoc:BEDINGS OF M!NNEsOTA STATE BAR AssN., 12-17 (1940).
Pennsylvania, 1943. See note, 17 TEMPLB L.Q. 276 (1943).
New York, 1947. See note, 22 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. Rnv. 458 (1947).
Michigan, 1947. See Neef, "Comparative Negligence," 27 Mich. S. B. J. 34 (May,
1948).
lllincns, 1949. See 30 CmCAGO BAR REc. 391, 394 (1949).
Ii Such a compensation plan is now in effect in Saskatchewan. Sask. Stats. (1947) c.

15.
6 "Yet that very theoi:y prevailed in Wiscon'sin when the legislature passed our comparative negligence law in 1931, which followed the introduction into our 1929 legislature
of a bill placing the entire neld of compensation for accidents under the jurisdiction of a
commission, which bill passed the Wisconsin senate but did not reach the house for action
before the termination of the legislature. It has been fairly stated, I believe, that were
it not for the comparative negligence doctrine, adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in
1931, there is little question but that serious effort would have been made in the succeeding legislature of 1933 to put the entire neld of damages, arising as the result of an
accident, under the jurisdiction of a commission, and it was aptly said by the author of
Wisconsin's comparative negligence law that: 'With comparative negligence as the rule
applicable to automobile litigation in Wisconsin, there was no immediate need, if any,
for the adoption of any commission form of administration of automobile legislation.' "
Hayes, ''Rule of Comparative Negligence and Its Operation in Wisconsin," 23 Omo STATE
BAR AssN. REP. 233 at 234 (1950).
7 The European history is well reviewed in Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the
March," 28 Cm-KENT L: REv. 189 at 238-244 (1950).

1953]

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

467

Great Britain,8 all of the Canadian provinces,9 New Zealand10 and
W estem Australia11 now have come to the same result, so that very
little of the British Empire is left with the common law rule. Even
in the United States there is far more in the way of division of damages
than is generally realized. There are some forty statutes12 on the
books, and apparently in successful operation; and it is a fair estimate
that there are about twelve hundred cases in which they have been
applied. Almost nothing has been written about these decisions; but
they represent a body of law of considerable importance, in which
a procedure over which there has been much theoretical dispute has
been put into practice. It is the purpose of this article to inquire, so
far as possible, into the actual operation of the damage apportionment
statutes, and to offer some conclusions as to the most desirable form
of act for any legislature about to set forth upon these relatively
uncharted seas.
The State of the Common Law

The defense of contributory negligence originated in 1809 with
the case of Butterfield 11. Forrester.13 The defendant, who was repairing his house, had left a pole projecting across part of the highway;
and the plaintiff, riding home from a public house in the dusk, did
not see the pole, rode into it, and was thrown from his horse and
injured. Lord Ellenborough disposed of the matter very briefly with
the statement that "A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction
which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it,
8 Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. See WILLIAMs, JoINT ToRTS AND
CoNTRIBOTORY NEGLIGENCE 533-535, and c. 13 (1951); Williams, ''The Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945," 9 MoD. L. REv. 105 (1945).
9 Most of the Canadian statutes have been amended since their original enactment.
Their latest form is found in Alberta Rev. Stat. (1942) c. 116; British Columbia Rev. Stat.
(1936) c. 52, amended by Rev. Stat. (1948) c. 68; Manitoba R.S.M. (1940) c. 215; New
Brunswick Rev. Stat. (1927) c. 143; Nova Scotia Stat. (1926) c. 3; Ontario Rev. Stat.
(1937) c. 115; Prince Edward Island Stat. (1938) c. 5; Saskatchewan Stat. (1944) c. 23.
Quebec, with its civil law heritage, divides the damages without a statute. See Nichols
Chemical Co. v. Lefebvre, 42 Can. S.C. Rep. 402 (1909); Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Frechette,
23 Que. K.B. 459 (1915).
10 New Zealand Stat. (1947) No. 3, p. 29. See 23 N.Z. L.J. 215 at 229 (1947).
11 Western Australia Stat. (1947) No. 23. See Shatwell, "Contributory Negligence
and Apportionment Statutes," 1 W. AosT. ANN. L. REv. 145 (1949).
12 The Report of the Casualty Committee in 18 lNsORANCB CoONSEL J. 374 (1951),
which contains a useful review of the law of the various states on contributory negligence
and contribution, omits any reference to a number of these statutes.
1311 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
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if he did not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the
. ht ."14
.
ng
There has been much speculation as to why the rule thus declared
found such ready acceptance in later decisions, both in England and
in the United States.15 The explanations given by the courts themselves never have carried much conviction. Most of the decisions have
talked about "proximate cause," saying that the plaintiff's negligence
is an intervening, insulating cause between the defendant's negligence
and the injury.16 But this cannot be supported unless a meaning is
assigned to proximate cause which is found nowhere else. If two
automobiles collide and injure a bystander, the negligence of one driver
is not held to be a superseding cause which relieves the other of liability; and there is no visible reason for any different conclusion when
the action is by one driver against the other. It has been said that the
defense has a penal basis, and is intended to punish the plaintiff for
his own misconduct;17 or that the court will not aid one who is himself
at fault, and he must come into court with clean hands.18 But this
is no explanation of the many cases, particularly those of the last clear
chance, in which a plaintiff clearly at fault is permitted to recover. It
has been said that the rule is intended to discourage accidents, by
denying recovery to those who fail to use proper care for their own
safety; but the assumption that the speeding motorist is, or should be,
meditating on the possible failure of a lawsuit for his possible injuries
lacks all reality, and it is quite as reasonable to say that the rule promotes accidents by encouraging the negligent defendant. Probably
the true explanation lies merely in the highly individualistic attitude
of the common law of the early nineteenth century. The period of
development of contributory negligence was that of the industrial
revolution, and there is reason to think that the courts found in this
14 Continuing: "In cases of persons riding upon what is considered to be the wrong
side of the road, that would not authorise another purposely to ride up against them. One
person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two
things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the
defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." 11 East
60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809).
15 See Bohlen, "Contributory Negligence," 21 HARv. L. RI!v. 233 (1908); Lowndes,
"Contributory Negligence," 22 GEORGETOWN L.J. 674 (1934); Green, "Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause," 6 N.C. L. Rev. 3 (1927).
16 Bowen, L.J., in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685 at 697 (1897).; Gilman v.
Central Vermont R. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122 (1919); Ware v. SauHey, 194 Ky. 53,
237 S.W. 1060 (1922); Turum v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 154 N.C. 408, 70 S.E. 845
(1911); Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Wills, Ill Va. 32, 68 S.E. 395 (1910).
J.7Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Wakelin v. London & S.W. R. Co., 12 A.C. 41, 45 (1886).
18 Owen, C.J., in Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887).
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defense, along with the concepts of duty and proximate cause, a convenient instrument of control over the jury, by which the liabilities
of rapidly growing industry were curbed and kept within bounds.19
Criticism of the denial of all recovery was not slow in coming, and
it has been with us for more than a century.20 The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious injustice of
a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties
on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least able to
bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who
goes scot free. No one ever has succeeded in justifying that as a
policy, and no one ever will. Its outrageousness became especially
apparent in the cases of injuries to employees, where a momentary
lapse of caution after a lifetime of care in the face of the employer's
negligence might wreck a man's life and leave him uncompensated
as a charge upon society; and the demand for some modification of the
rule became an integral part of the movement which finally led to the
workmen's compensation acts.
To some limited extent the remedy has been in the hands of the
jury. Every trial lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow
recovery in cases of contributory negligence, and that the compromise
in the jury room does result in some diminution of the damages because
of the plaintiff's fault. 21 But the process is at best a haphazard and
most unsatisfactory one. There are still juries which understand and
respect the court's instructions on contributory negligence, just as there
are other juries which throw them out of the window and refuse even
to reduce the recovery by so much as a dime. Above all there are many
directed verdict cases where the plaintiff's negligence, however slight it
may be in comparison with that of the defendant, is still clear beyond
dispute, and the court has no choice but to declare it as a matter of law.
A striking illustration is the Minnesota case in which a motorist entering an intersection failed to yield the right of way on the mistaken
assumption that the speeding defendant woul4 slow down for him, and
the supreme court uttered an almost pathetic appeal to a legislature,
19Malone, "The Formative Era of Comparative Negligence," 41 Ju.. L. REv. 151
(1946); Malone, "Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage," 6 LA. L.
R.BV. 125 (1945).
20 One of the best statements of the attack on contrfbutory negligence is found in
Green, "Illinois Negligence Law," 39 h.L. L. REV, 36, 116, 197 (1944).
21 "We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that
in many cases juries apply it [apportionment] in spite of us." Holt, J., in Haeg v.
Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425 at 430, 281 N.W. 261 (1938). See also ULMAN,
A JUDGE TAXI!s THI! STAND 30-34 (1933).
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which still remains indifferent, to relieve it of the necessity of such
decisions by adopting a "comparative negligence" act.22
Although the courts almost from the beginning have displayed an
uneasy consciousness that something is wrong, they have been slow to
move. In only three respects have the rigors of the ordinary rule of
contributory negligence been modified at common law. The defense
was one to a negligence action only, and it never applied to intentional
torts such as assault and battery;23 and from this there developed the
first exception, that mere contributory negligence is no defense where
the defendant's conduct is so aggravated that it approaches intent, and
can b e charactenze
· d as "wilful," "wanton, " or "reckl ess. "24 I n sueh a
case the plaintiff is barred from recovery only when his own conduct
is similarly aggravated, and can be described in the same terms.2 ~
There is here, of course, a rough balancing of one fault against the
other, but the difference is declared to be one of kind rather than of
degree. Except in two or three states such as Minnesota,26 which have
misdefined "wilful negligence" to include any negligence whatever
after discovery of the peril of another, the exception has applied to
relatively few cases, and has had only limited importance.
· A second exception, of comparatively recent origin, eliminates the
d~fense of contributory negligence where the action is founded upon
the defendant's violation of a statute, such as a child labor act,21 which
22 "No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of depriving plaintiff of his
verdict and of all right to collect damages from defendant; but the rule of contributory
negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law and gives us no alternative other
than to hold that defendant is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It would
be hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that in operation the rule of com•
. parative negligence would serve justice more faithfully than that of contributory- negligence. • • • But as long as the legislature refuses to substitute the rule of comparative for
that of contributory negligence we have no option but to enforce the law in a proper case."
Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425 at 430, 281 N.W. 261 (1938).
23 Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132 (1877); Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442, 37 Am. Rep.
170 (1880); Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474, 34 S.E. 634 (1899); Birmingham Railway, L. & P. Co. v. Jones, 146 Ala. 277, 41 S. 146 (1906).
24 Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 P. 804 (1908) ("wanton
misconduct"); Ziman v. Whitley, 110 Conn. 108, 147 A. 370 (1929) ("reckless indifference"); Mihelich v. Butte Electric R. Co., 85 Mont. 604, 281 P. 540 (1929) ("wilful or
wanton act"); Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 ill. 472, 126 N.E. 97 (1928)
("conscious indifference to consequences").
25 Hinkle v. Minneapolis, A. & C. R. Co., 162 Minn. 112, 202 N.W. 340 (1925);
Moore v. Lindell R. Co., 176 Mo. 528, 75 S.W. 672 (1903); Osteen v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 119 S.C. 438, 112 S.E. 352 (1923); Elliott v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa.
643, 53 A. (2d) 81 (1947).
26 See notes, 8 MINN. L. R:sv. 329 (1924); 24 MINN. L. R:sv. 81 (1939).
21Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 A. 642 (1907); Karpeles v.
Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. IOI (1919); Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473,
140 N.W. 84 (1913); Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W.
482 (1920); Louisville, N. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyons, 155 Ky. 396, 159 S.W. 971 (1913);
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is construed as intended to place the entire responsibility upon the de-

fendant, and to protect the plaintiff even against the consequences of
his own fault. 28 The reason given is the obvious one, that otherwise
the intent of the legislature would be defeated. Such acts are, however, few in number and clearly of a special character; and as to the
violation of all other statutes, contributory negligence remains effective
as a complete defense. 29
The most important common law modification is that which bears
the name of the last clear chance.30 It originated in 1842 in the case
of Davies 11. Mann,31 where the plaintiff left his ass fettered in the
highway and the defendant drove into it. The doctrine found ready
acceptance in the United States;32 but from its origin it has acquired
Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920); American Car & Foundry
Co. v. Annentraut, 214 ill. 509, 73 N.E. 766 (1905).
28 Prohibiting the sale of dangerous articles to minors: Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis.
235, 134 N.W. 899 (1912); McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584, 119 A. 721 (1923).
Protection of intoxicated persons: Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610, 23 A. 320
(1892); Hauth v. Sambo, 100 Neb. 160, 158 N.W. 1036 (1916). Cf. Mayes v. Byers,
214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W. (2d) 403 (1943) (requiring stairways in "on sale" liquor establishments to be well lighted); Bennett Drug Stores v. Mosely, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E.
(2d) 208 (1942) (sale of poison to person who does not know its character).
Factory acts and other statutes for the protection of worlanen: Osborne v. Salvation
Anny, (2d Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 929; Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 181 ill. 495, 55
N.E. 131 (1899); Caspar v. Lewin, 82 Kan. 604, 109 P. 657 (1910); Chicago-Coulterville
Coal Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., (D.C. Mo. 1904) 130 F. 957.
Railway fencing acts: Flint & Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 510 (1874);
Congdon v. Central Vermont R. Co., 56 Vt. 390, 48 Am. Rep. 793 (1883); Welty v. Indianapolis & V. R. Co., 105 Ind. 55, 4 N.E. 410 (1885); Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v.
Paxton, 75 Kan. 197, 88 P. 1082 (1907); Quackenbush v. Wisconsin & M. R. Co., 71
Wis. 472, 37 N.W. 834 (1888).
Statutes making railways liable for fires: West v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Iowa
654, 35 N.W. 479 (1887); Bowen v. Boston & A. R. Co., 179 Mass. 524, 61 N.E. 141
(1901); Matthews v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S.W. 802 (1897); Peter v.
Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 121 Mich. 324, 80 N.W. 295 (1899).
29 Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W. (2d) 555 (1947); Browne v.
Siegel, Cooper & Co., 191 ill. 226, 60 N.E. 815 (1901); Keenan v. Edison Electric ill. Co.,
159 Mass. 379, 34 N.E. 366 (1893); Narramore v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. R. Co., (6th
Cir. 1899) 96 F. 298; Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921); Smith v.
Central of Ga. R. Co., 165 Ala. 407, 51 S. 792 (1910); Gartin v. Meredith, 153 Ind. 16,
53 N.E. 936 (1899); Gipson v. Southern R. Co., (C.C. Ala. 1905) 140 F. 410; Brown v.
Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 109 Wis. 384, 85 N.W. 271 (1901). See Prosser, "Contributory
Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute," 32 MrnN. L. REv. 105 (1948).
so See Schofield, ''Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence," 3 HAnv. L.
REv. 263 (1890); Bohlen, "Contributory Negligence," 21 HAnv. L. REv. 233 (1908);
Smith, ''Last Clear Chance," 82 CBNT. L.J. 425, 55 AM.. L. REv. 897 (1916); Lowndes,
"Contributory Negligence," 22 GBoRGBTOWN L.J. 674 (1934); James, "Last Clear Chance:
A Transitional Doctrine," 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938); MacIntyre, ''The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance," 53 HAnv. L. REv. 1225 (1940).
s110 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
32 ''The groans, ineffably and mournfully sad, of Davies' dying donkey, have resounded around the earth. The last lingering gaze from the soft, mild eyes of this docile
animal, like the last parting sunbeams of the softest day in spring, has appealed to and
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forever the name of the "jackass doctrine," with whatever implications
that may carry. In its original form, it was stated to be that where the
defendant had the last, and therefore the better, opportunity to avoid
the accident, his negligence superseded that of the plaintiff, and contributory negligence was no defense. As in the case of contributory
negligence itself, the explanations given are not at all convincing. It is
sometimes said33 that the later negligence of the defendant must necessarily be the greater negligence, and that it is a rule of comparative
fault which is being applied. This may be true in some instances
where the defendant discovers the plaintiff's helpless situation and his
conduct displays reckless disregard of it; but it can scarcely account
for many others in which the negligence consists merely of failure to
discover the situation at all,34 or of slowness, clumsiness, inadvertence
or an error in judgment in dealing with it.35 Most of the courts have
talked of proximate cause, which makes no sense at all. If the negligence of the two parties injures a third, as where a collision injures a
bystander, it never has been held that the party whose fault is prior
in point of time is relieved of responsibility by the mere fact that the
negligence of the other is later;36 and no one ever has offered any
reason for a different result where the action is between the negligent
parties.
The real explanation would appear to be nothing more than a dislike for the defense of contributory negligence, and a rebellion against
its application in a group of cases where its hardship is most apparent.
The last clear chance has been called a "transitional doctrine,"37 a way
touched the hearts of men. There has girdled the globe a band of sympathy for Davies'
immortal 'critter.' Its ghost, like Banquo's ghost, will not down at the behests of the
people who are charged with inflicting injuries, nor can its groanings be silenced by the
rantings and excoriations of carping critics. The law as enunciated in that case has come
to stay." McLain, J., in Fuller v. Illinois Central R. Co., 100 Miss. 705 at 717, 56 S. 783
(1911).
8BWilson v. Southern Traction Co., 111 Tex. 361, 234 S.W. 663 (1921); Rawitzer
v. St. Paul City R. Co., 93 Minn. 84, 100 N.W. 664 (1904); Moreno v. Los Angeles
Transfer Co., 44 Cal. App. 551, 186 P. 800 (1920); Dildine v. Flynn, 116 Kan. 563,
227 P. 340 (1924).
84 Nicol v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 71 Wash. 409, 128 P. 628 (1912);
Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N.C. 616, 23 S.E. 264 (1895); Leinbach v.
Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 23 P. (2d) 449 (1933); Independent Lumber
Co. v. Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P. (2d) 1052 (1938); Teakle v. San Pedro, L.A. &:
S.L. R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402 (1907).
35 As for example in Smith v. Connecticut R. & L. Co., 80 Conn. 268, 67 A. 888
(1907); Clark v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 109 N.C. 430, 14 S.E. 43 (1891).
86 Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 P. 436 (1907); Tetreault v. Gould, 83 N.H. 99, 138 A. 544 (1927); Austin Electric R. Co. v. Faust, 63 Tex.
Civ. App. 91, 133 S.W. 449 (1910).
87 James, "Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine," 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).
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station on the_ road to apportionment of damages; but its effect has
been to freeze the transition rather than to speed it. Actually the last
clear chance cases present one of the worst tangles known to the law.
In some jurisdictions the application of the rule has been limited to
cases where the plaintiff is helpless and the defendant has in fact discovered the situation;38 in others it is extended to cases where the defendant might have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable care.39
In still others it is applied to situations where the plaintiff is not helpless at all and continues to be negligent, but is unaware of his danger,
while the defendant has discovered it.40 In still others it is applied to
cases where the defendant's antecedent negligence, as in driving a car
with defective brakes, has rendered him unable to take advantage of the
"last clear chance" he would otherwise have had.41
Intermingled with these rules there is so much in the way of
disagreement over the effect to be given to circumstantial evidence,
· 1ent to "saw,"that there
and whth
e er "ough t to h ave seen,,.1s eqmva
are almost literally forty-eight sets of rules in as many states. There
is often the greatest confusion in a single state;42 and in many jurisdictions, as the defendant's negligence increases the less his liability will
be-the man who looks and discovers the danger but is slow in applying
his brakes may be liable, where the man who never looks at all or who
has no brakes to apply is not. Missouri has developed a fearful and
wonderful "humanitarian doctrine," which seems to be comprehensible
only in Missouri, if there; 43 and three or four states, such as Illinois,
38 Storr v. New York Central R. Co., 261 N.Y. 348, 185 N.E. 407 (1933); Cleveland
R. Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873 (1932); St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v.
Watts, 110 Tex. 106, 216 S.W. 391 (1919).
39Nicol v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 71 Wash. 409, 128 P. 628 (1912);
Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N.C. 616, 23 S.E. 264 (1895); Teal<le v. San
Pedro, L.A. & S.L. R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402 (1907); Independent Lumber Co. v.
Leatherwood, 102 Colo. 460, 79 P. (2d) 1052 (1938); Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound
Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 23 P. (2d) 449 (1933).
40 Indianapolis Traction & Term. Co. v. Croly, 54 Ind. App. 566, 96 N.E. 973
(1911); Darling v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 242 P. 703 (1925); Groves v.
Webster City, 222 Iowa 849, 270 N.W. 329 (1936); Tyrrell v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 77
N.H. 320, 91 A. 179 (1914); Yazoo & M.V. R. Co. v. Lee, 148 Miss. 809, 114 S. 866
(1927).
4 1 British Columbia Blee. R. Co. v. Loach, [1916] 1 A.C. 719; Lloyd v. Albemarle
& R. R. Co., 118 N.C. 1010, 24 S.E. 805 (1898); Little Rocle Traction & Blee. Co. v.
Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 62 S.W. 1045 (1901); Dent v. Bellows Falls & S.R. St. R. Co., 95
Vt. 523, 116 A. 83 (1922).
42 See DeMuth, "Derogation of the Common Law Rule of Contributory Negligence,''
7 ROOKY MT. L. REv. 161 (1935).
48 See Gaines, ''The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri,'' 20 ST. Loms L. REv. I 13
(1935); Becker, ''The Humanitarian Doctrine,'' 3 Mo. L. REv. 392 (1938).
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Minnesota and South Carolina,44 repudiate the whole "last clear
chance" by name, and then proceed to apply it in cases of discovered
peril by miscalling it "wilful negligence," or "proximate cause." It is
really a most amazing picture, which could be the work of no one but
lawyers.
Quite apart from all this confusion, the real objection to the last
clear chance is that it seeks to alleviate the hardships of contributory
negligence by shifting the entire loss due to the fault of both parties
from the plaintiff to the defendant. It is still no more reasonable to
charge the defendant with the plaintiff's share of the consequences of
his fault than to charge the plaintiff with the defendant's; and it is
no better policy to relieve the negligent plaintiff of all responsibility
for his injury than it is to relieve the negligent defendant. The whole
floundering, haphazard, makeshift device operates in favor of some
plaintiffs by inflicting obvious injustice upon some defendants; but
it leaves untouched the greater number of contributory negligence
cases in which the necessary time interval or element of discovery does
not appear and the last clear chance cannot apply.
When actuaries sit down to calculate liability insurance rates for
automobile drivers and other defendants, they must, under the existing
state of the law, take into account the certainty that in many cases the
insured who negligently injures another will escape all liability; that in
others, juries, in partial defiance of the court's instructions, will
diminish the damages by some uncertain amount and to that extent
divide the loss between the partj.es; and that in still others, where the
last clear chance applies or the instructions are jettisoned completely,
the entire loss resulting from the fault of both parties will fall upon
the insured. From an actuarial point of view these possibilities undoubtedly, in some unknown degree, balance one another; but as a
pattern for the operation of courts and the administration of justice
they leave much to be desired.
Apart from the ·inevitable self-interest of defendants who find an
advantage in the present state of the law, proposals for division of the
damages meet with two objections. One is that it is impossible to
compare fault with fault, and that any apportionment of the loss on
the basis of such a comparison can be nothing more than the wildest
guess. Obviously any estimate that 40 per cent of the total fault rests
with the pedestrian who walks out into the street in the path of an
44 Walldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 ill. 472, 126 N.E. 97 (1928); Anderson
v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R. Co., 103 Minn. 224, 114 N.W. 1123 (1908); Clyde
v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 109 S.C. 290, 96 S.E. 116 (1918).
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automobile, and 60 per cent with the driver who is not looking and
runs him down, represents nothing resembling accuracy based on
demonstrable fact. The estimate might quite as well be anywhere
between 25-75 and 75-25. Yet it is equally clear that a division of the
plaintiff's damages on any such basis is at least more accurate than
one based on the arbitrary conclusion that 100 per cent of the responsibility rests with the plaintiff and none whatever with the defendant,
or, if the last clear chance is applicable, 100 per cent with the defendant
and none with the plaintiff-both of which are demonstrably wrong.
Nor is such an estimate in itself any more foolish, or more difficult,
than the one which assigns $2,000 as fair value and compensation for
the pain of a broken leg, or the humiliation of a disfigured nose, to say
nothing of estimates based on a prognosis of speed of recovery, future
earnings or permanent disability. At least the host of cases show that
the estimate is being made in practice every day.
The other objection has more substance. It is that juries cannot
be trusted to follow an instruction to divide the damages according to
fault; that their well-known sympathy for the man on crutches in the
courtroom and their proverbial bias against corporations and insurance
companies lead them now to ignore convincing evidence of contributory
negligence and return a full verdict for the plaintiff, and they will continue to do the same under any apportionment law; and that the proposed change merely robs the defendant of all possibility of a directed
verdict without any guarantee that the apportionment will in fact be
made. This uneasy distrust of the twelve men, and now women, in
the box has bulked large in American negligence law; and it is significant that damage apportionment developed first, and has succeeded
best, in courts where there is no jury to contend with. What validity
the objection has, and what may be done to meet it, remains to be
considered.
Apportionment by the Jury

The simplest possible method of apportionment, and the oldest,4 11 •
is to divide the damages equally between tlie negligent parties. This
is the method developed, around 1700, by the English admiralty
courts,46 which of course had no jury, and were strongly inHuenced
4 5 Early admiralty cases, around 1614, divided the loss evenly where only the defendant's ship was at fault. MARsnBN, A TBEATISB oN nm LAW OF Cou.ismNs AT SBA,
8th ed., 135 (1923).
46 Backham v. Chapman, Ad. Ct. Ass. Book (Jan. 20, 1695); Noden v. Ashton, Lioels,
File 128, No. 350, Ass. Book (June 20, 1706). See MAltsDBN, A TBEATISB ON nm LAw
OF Cou.isxoNs AT SBA, 8th ed., 195 (1923).
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by international rules derived from the civil law. It is still followed
by the American courts of admiralty in collision cases.47 Crude as it
is, it probably results, in most instances, in a closer approximation of
substantial justice than a denial of all recovery. England continued
to adhere to the same rule48 until 1911, when it conformed to the
Brussels Maritime Convention49 of 1909 by adopting a statute providing for a division of the damages "in proportion to the degree in
which each vessel was at fault." 50
There has been an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the arbitrary
American rule, and several of the lower federal courts have uttered
complaints about it where the' fault of the two parties was out of all
proportion.51 It has been proposed from time to time52 that the United
47The Schooner Catherine, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 170 (1855); The Atlas, 93 U.S.
302, 23 L. Ed. 963 (1876); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 1 S.Ct. 41 (1882); Belden v.
Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 14 S.Ct. 264 (1893); Ralli v. Throop, 157 U.S. 386, 15 S.Ct. 647
(1895); The Chattahoochie, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491 (1899); The New York, 175
U.S. 187, 20 S.Ct. 67 (1899); The Albert Dumois, 177 U.S. 240, 20 S.Ct. 595 (1900);
Erie R. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220, 27 S.Ct. 246 (1906); The Eugene F.
Moran, 212 U.S. 466, 29 S.Ct. 339 (1909); White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod
& N.Y.C. Co., 258 U.S. 341, 42 S.Ct. 338 (1922); United States v. Norwegian Bark
Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 45 S.Ct. 112 (1924); Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294
U.S. 394, 55 S.Ct. 467 (1935). See Huger, ''Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at
Sea," 13 CoRN. L.Q. 531 (1927); Sprague, ''Divided Damages," 6 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. 15
(1928); Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L.Q. 333 at
339-359 (1932); Derby, "Divided Damages in Maritime Cases," 33 VA. L. REv. 389
(1947); Dickinson and Andrews, "A Decade of Admiralty," 36 CALIP. L. REv. 169
(1948); Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 Cm-Kmn- L. REv. 189, 218238 (1950).
48 Hay v. La Neve, 2 Shaw Sc. App. Cas. 395 (1824); Cayzer v. Carron, 9 App.
Cas. 873 (1884).
49See 6 BENEDICT, AMBru:CAN ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., 4 (1941).
®The English Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 57, §1 provides
that: "(l) Where, by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or
more of those vessels, to their cargoes or freight, or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each
vessel was in fault: Provided that (a) if, having regard to all the circumstances of the
case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned
equally; and (b) nothing in this section shall operate so as to render any vessel liable for
any loss or damage to which her fault has not contributed. • • ."
51 'We reach this conclusion with regret. The [libellant's] fault was far more egregious. This is a case where the Continental rule of comparative negligence would produce
a more just result." Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d)
250 at 252. See also The City of Chattanooga, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 23 at 23; The
Margaret, (3d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 923 at 928; Postal S.S. Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co.,
(2d Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 297 at 298.
52 The American delegation to the Convention signed the final draft. The President
and the Secretary of State proposed legislation, but discontinued their efforts when many
protests were raised. In 1922 the Maritime Law Association of the United States apparently
favored adoption of the English statute, but reversed its stand in 1927. In 1925 the Committee on Admiralty of the American Bar Association approved the change; but in 1929
the Executive Committee of the Association reported that, as the existing law had operated
satisfactorily for so many years, no change should be made. The history is well reviewed
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States should adopt the English rule, and in 1937 the proposal received a favorable report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,53 but World War II prevented any action.54 One important
development in the admiralty courts, however, was that when the
question arose in cases which did not involve collisions,55 but negligent
injuries to maritime employees, the rule of equal division was not applied, and the libellant's recovery was reduced in proportion to his
estimated fault. 56 These admiralty decisions played a significant part
in the labor agitation which finally led to legislation.
Apart from admiralty there was little change in the common law
rule before 1908. Illinois57 and Kansas58 tried, and abandoned, experiments with "degrees" of negligence. Tennessee59 and Georgia60
worked out the general idea of apportionment of damages, subject to
restrictions later to be considered, and Florida61 copied the railroad
liability section of the Georgia code. Maryland62 made the apportionment rule applicable to cases of miners and clay workers employed
in two counties in the state. Louisiana had a provision in its code,63
enacted in 1825 by lawyers at least familiar with the civil law, which
appeared clearly to call for apportionment in cases of property damage,
and might well have led to a general apportionment rule; but the
Louisiana courts, under the pressure of expanding industry, as well as
the persuasive authority of cases from adjoining jurisdictions and a
desire for uniformity, ignored the provision or construed it away,6'
and it has remained a dead letter on the books.
in short space in Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 Cm-K-BNT L. R:Ev.
189, 234-236 (1950).
113 Executive

Report No. 4, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939).
4 Bmramcrr, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., 4, 49, 262 (1941).
115 The apportionment rule was not limited to collision cases. The Steamer Max
Moms, 137 U.S. 1, 11 S.Ct. 29 (1890); The Scandanavia, (D.C. Me. 1907) 156 F. 403.
116 The Explorer, (D.C. La. 1884) 20 F. 135; Olson v. Flavel, (D.C. Ore. 1888) 34 F.
477; The Mystic, (D.C. N.Y. 1890) 44 F. 398; Cricket S.S. Co. v. Parry, (2d Cir. 1920)
263 F. 523.
57 See text infra at notes 110-119.
118 See text infra at notes 120-121.
59 See text infra at notes 124, 189-190.
60 See text infra at notes 146-151, 191-192.
61 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944) §768.06, enacted in 1887.
62 Md. Acts 1902, c. 412.
63 Now La. Civ. Code (Dart. 1945), art. 2323: "The damage caused is not always
estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced according
to circumstances, if the owner of the thing has exposed it imprudently."
64 Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 18 La. 339 (1841); Myers v. Perry, I La. Ann. 372
(1846); Belle Alliance Co. v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 125 La. 777, 51 S. 846 (1910); Ortolano v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. Co., 109 La. 902, 33 S. 914 (1903); Burvant v. Wolfe,
126 La. 787, 52 S. 1025 (1910); Legendre v. Consumers' Seltzer & M.W. Co., 147 La.
M

478

MICHIGAN

LAw Revmw

[ Vol. 51

The apportionment of damages was first brought home to most of
the country in 1908 by the Federal Employers' Liability Act,65 whicli
applied to all negligence actions, in the federal or state courts, for
injuries to railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce.66 It
was, of course, an outcome of the prolonged labor agitation, and it preceded by only a few years the wave of workmen's compensation acts.
It contained the following provision: 67
"In all actions hereafter brought against any such common
carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of
this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact
that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to such employee; Provided, That no such employee who may
be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
The example of the Federal Employers' Liability Act set off a flood
of labor legislation of the same general kind. The apportionment provision was incorporated by reference68 into the Jones Act and the
Merchant Marine Act, enacted in 1915 and 1920,69 and applicable
to injuries to maritime employees. The provision was repeated in
substance in a series of s~te "employers' liability acts," covering rail120, 84 S. 517 (1920); Inman v. Silver Fleet of Memphis, (La. App. 1937) 175 S. 435;
Mason v. Price, (La. App. 1947) 32 S. (2d) 853. See Malone, "Comparative NegligenceLouisiana's Forgotten Heritage," 6 LA. L. REv. 125 (1945); Hillyer, "Comparative Negligence in Louisiana," 11 ToLANB L. REv. 112 (1936).
65 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908), now 45 U.S.C. (1946) §§51-60.
66 The first statute passed, in 1906, was held unconstitutional because it included
railroad employees engaged in intrastate commerce. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S.
463, 28 S.Ct. 141 (1908). With the change made, the second statute was held constitutional in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169 (1912).
67 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §53'.
68 The history of the act is reviewed in The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56
S.Ct. 707 (1936).
69March 4, 1915, c. 153, §20, 38 Stat. L. 1185; June 5, 1920, c. 250, §33, 41 Stat. L.
1007; now 46 U.S.C. (1946) §688. Applied in Stewart v. United States Shipping Board
E.F. Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 676; Johnson v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1934)
7 F. Supp. 133; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262 (1939);
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 712 (1936); Cleveland-Cliffs hon Co. v. Martini, (6th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 632; Desrochers v. United States, (2d Cir. 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 919; McCauley v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co., 167 Ore. 80, 115 P. (2d) 307 (1941);
Brown v. Intercoastal Fisheries, 34 Wash. (2d) 48, 207 P. (2d) 1205 (1949); Alexander
v. Philadelphia Ceiling & Stevedoring Co., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 178.
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road employees engaged in intrastate commerce, which were adopted
in Colorado,70 Iowa,71 Kansas,72 Kentucky,73 Minnesota,74 Montana,711
North Carolina,76 North Dakota,77 South Carolina,78 South Dakota79
Texas,80 Virginia,81 and Wyoming. 82 Broader statutes of the same kind
were made applicable to employees engaged in certain specified occupations, usually hazardous, such as mining or lumbering, in Arizona,83
Florida,84 Iowa,811 and Oregon,86 and to all employees of intrastate
corporations in Arkansas.87
Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 139, §87 (2).
71 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §§479.124 and 479.125. See 35 IowA L. REv. 484
(1950).
72 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §66-238.
73 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1950) §277.320. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chapman's Admx.,
300 Ky. 835, 190 S.W. (2d) 542 (1945).
74 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1949) §219.79.
75 Mont. Rev. Laws (1947) §72-649. Applied in Great Northern R. Co. v. Wojtala,
(9th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 609; see also Palmer v. Great Northern R. Co., 119 Mont.
68, 170 P. (2d) 768 (1946). The statute is limited to the railroad's negligent handling of
cars or defects in cars or other equipment.
76 N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) c. 60, §67, which includes employees of logging roads
and tramroads. Applied in Stewart v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 193 N.C. 138, 136 S.E.
385 (1927); Stamey v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 197 N.C. 391, 148 S.E. 436 (1929); McLean v. Andrews Hardwood Co., 200 N.C. 312, 156 S.E. 528 (1931). The act does not
apply unless the employee is engaged in a "railroad operation." Gurganous v. Camp Mfg.
Co., 204 N.C. 525, 168 S.E. 833 (1933).
77N.D. Rev. Laws (1943) §49-1603.
78 S.C. Code (1942) §8367. Applied in Boyleston v. Southern R. Co., 211 S.C. 232,
44 S.E. (2d) 537 (1947).
79 S.D. Code (1939) §52.0945.
80 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925) art. 6440. Held constitutional in St. Louis,
S.F.&T. R. Co. v. Jenkins, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 137 S.W. 711. Applied in Houston &
T. R. Co. v. Bright, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 156 S.W. 304; Angelina & N. R. Co. v. Due,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 166 S.W. 918; San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co. v. Galbreath, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916) 185 S.W. 901; Lancaster v. Jarrett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 258 S.W. 271.
81 Va. Code Ann. (1942) §5792.
82 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §65-502.
83 Ariz. Code Ann. (1933) §56-805. Applied in Calumet & Arizona Min. Co. v.
Chambers, 20 Ariz. 54, 176 P. 839 (1918); Young Mines Co. v. Blackbum, 22 Ariz.
199, 196 P. 167 (1920).
84 Fla. Stat. (1941) §769.03. Applied in Tampa Electric Co. v. Limpus, 83 Fla. 537,
91 S. 559 (1922); Tampa Electric R. Co. v. Bryant, 101 Fla. 204, 133 S. 887 (1931);
Key West Electric Co. v. Higgs, 118 Fla. 11, 136 S. 639 (1931).
85 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §§479-124 and 479-125. Applied in Potier v. Winifred
Coal Co., 192 Iowa 1280, 184 N.W. 739 (1921); Oestereich v. Leslie, 212 Iowa 105, 234
N.W. 229 (1931); Lang v. Hedrick, 229 Iowa 766, 295 N.W. 107 (1940); Price v.
McNeill, 237 Iowa 1120, 24 N.W. (2d) 464 (1946).
86 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §102-1606. Applied in Filkins v. Portland Lumber
Co., 71 Ore. 249, 142 P. 578 (1914); Olds v. Olds, 88 Ore. 209, 171 P. 1046 (1918);
Kuntz v. Emerson Hardwood Co., 93 Ore. 565, 184 P. 253 (1919); Fitzgerald v. OregonWashington R. & N. Co., 141 Ore. 1, 16 P. (2d) 27 (1932).
87 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §81-1202. Applied in American Co. v. Baker, 187 Ark.
492, 60 S.W. (2d) 572 (1933); L. J. Smith Const. Co. v. Tate, 151 Ark. 278, 237 S.W.
83 (1922); Hartman-Clark Bros. Co. v. Melton, 190 Ark. 1001, 82 S.W. (2d) 257
(1935); Goodin v. Boyd-Sicard Coal Co., 197 Ark. 175, 122 S.W. (2d) 548 (1938);
Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 201 Ark. 1088, 148 S.W. (2d) 650 (1941).
10 Colo.

480

MrcHIGAN

LAw R:svmw

[ Vol. 51

The legislation soon spread beyond the labor field. The ·apportionment provision was repeated in a 1920 federal statute88 covering
any death on the high seas. In Florida89 and Iowa90 the provision
was made applicable to any injury inflicted by a railroad. In Virginia91
it has been applied to accidents at crossings arising out of the railroad's
failure to give the required signals; and an old Tennessee statute92
has been given the same effect by construction. Several other states93
have enacted apportionment provisions which apply to labor or to railroad cases with limitations as to the extent of the plaintiff's negligence,
to be considered below. Finally, Mississippi adopted in 1910 a general
act94 applying apportionment to all actions for personal injuries, and
expanded it in 1920 to include damages to property.95 Mississippi thus
became the first, and is still the only, state to establish apportionment
as a general rule. A similar general act is now in force in the Canal
Zone.96
·
88 March 30, 1920, c. 111, §6, 41 Stat. L. 537, now 46 U.S.C. (1946) 766.
89 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944) §768.06. Applied in Dina v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 90
Fla. 558, 106 S. 416 (1926); Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140
S. 196 (1932), on rehearing 104 Fla. 371, 142 S. 909 (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Britton, 109 Fla. 212, 146 S. 842 (1933); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pidd, (5th
Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 153.
90 Iowa Code (1946) vol 2, p. 1843, Civil Proc. Rule 97.
91 Va. Code Ann. (1942} §3959. Applied in State & City Bank & Trust Co. v.
Norfolk & W. R. Co., 144 Va. 185, 131 S.E. 331 (1926); Southern R. Co. v. Johnson,
151 Va. 345, 146 S.E. 363 (1929); Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Hardy, 152 Va. 783, 148 S.E.
839 (1929); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. White, 158 Va. 243, 163 S.E. 530 (1931); Southern
R. Co. v. Whetzel, 159 Va. 796, 167 S.E. 427 (1933); Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Pulliam,
185 Va. 908, 41 S.E. (2d) 54 (1947)~ This has no application when the signals are
given. Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 53 S.E. (2d) 817 (1949).
92Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §2628-30, enacted in 1855. It was construed
and applied to Railroad v. Walker, 11 Heisk. (58 Tenn.) 383 (1872); Nashville & C. R.
Co. v. Nowlin, 1 Lea (69 Tenn.) 523 (1878); Tennessee Central R. Co. v. Page, 153
Tenn. 84, 282 S.W. 376 (1926); Tennessee Central R. Co. v. Binkley, 127 Tenn. 77, 153
S.W. 59 (1912); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Sigler, (6th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 279;
Southern R. Co. v. Koger, (6th Cir. 1915) 219 F. 702.
93 See text infra at notes 108-173.
94 Miss. Laws (1910) c. 135. Held not applicable to property damage in Krebs v.
Pascagoula St. R. & P. Co., 117 Miss. 771, 78 S. 753 (1918).
95 Miss. Laws (1920) c. 312. The amended act is now Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
§1454, reading as follows: "In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where
such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having control over the property may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
injured, or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the property.
Applied in Natchez & S.R. Co. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 S. 596 (1911); Yazoo
& M.V. R. Co. v. Carroll, 103 Miss. 830, 60 S. 1013 (1913); Yazoo & M.V. R. Co. v.
Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 S. 835 (1917); Tallahala Lumber Co. v. Holliman, 126
Miss. 308, 87 S. 661 (1921); Seifferman v. Leach, 161 Miss. 853, 138 S. 563 (1932);
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Humphries, 174 Miss. 459, 164 S. 22 (1935).
96Canal Zone Civ. Code (1934) §977. Applied in Panama R. Co. v. Davis, (5th Cir.
1936) 82 F. (2d) 123.
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Except where the statute itself provides some limitation, these
acts are held to require apportionment of the damages even though the
plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than that of the defendant,
and even though the one is considered "gross" and the other "slight."97
The apportionment must be made if negligence of both parties is found,
and it is error not to instruct the jury to make it.98 Although there
is a great deal of rather casual and careless language to the effect that
the plaintiff's recovery must be diminished to the extent that his negligence has been "causal," or has "contributed" to his injury,99 there
seems to be little doubt that, once causation is found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of comparative fault rather than comparative contribution.100 It is generally agreed, except for two de9'1Yazoo & M.V. R. Co. v. Carroll, 103 Miss. 830, 60 S. 1013 (1913); Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Wene, (7th Cir. 1913) 202 F. 887; New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Niebel,
(6th Cir. 1914) 214 F. 952; Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, (6th Cir. 1914) 214 F. 948;
Templeton v. Charleston & W.C. R. Co., 117 S.C. 44, 108 S.E. 363 (1921); Hines v.
Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 P. 165 (1921); Gregory v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 142 Va.
750, 128 S.E. 272 (1925); Humphreys v. East St. L. & S. R. Co., 253 ID. App. 450
(1929); Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Durham, 181 Miss. 559, 179 S. 285 (1938). See
also Yazoo & M.V. R. Co. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 S. 835 (1917), where a verdict
of $12,000 was reduced to $5,000 by way of apportionment.
98 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114, 33 S.Ct. 654 (1913); Seaboard
Air Line R. Co. v. Tilghman, 237 U.S. 499, 35 S.Ct. 653 (1915); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.
Co. v. Ballard, (5th Cir. 1940) 108 F. (2d) 768; Sherry v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 248 App.
Div. 439, 290 N.Y.S. 17 (1936).
''In cases of this character, where the evidence justifies a finding that both defendant
and plaintiff were guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, the jury should be
carefully instructed concerning the rule of comparative negligence established by the Federal Statute. It is the duty of the jury first to determine whether or not the defendant was
guilty of causal negligence, for if that issue is determined against the plaintiff there can
be no recovery. If the issue of the defendant's negligence is determined in favor of the
plaintiff, then the jury should consider whether or not be, too, was guilty of negligence
directly contributing to the happening of the accident, and, if they decide that issue against
the plaintiff, then, looking at the combined negligence of the plaintiff and defendant as a
whole, and using their best judgment based on the evidence before them, the next material subject for the jury to consider is in what ratio should this combined negligence be
distributed between the parties to the accident; in other words, how much, or what proportion, of the whole blame, or fault, should be attributable to each. After this problem
is solved, the jury must determine the amount of the damages suffered through the combined negligence, and deduct therefrom a proportion corresponding with the share of negligence charged by them against the plaintiff, • • • to be awarded as damages to the plaintiff. We do not mean to say that the method just outlined is the only way in which a
jury may proceed to reach its conclusions in the trial of causes involving comparative negligence, but rather simply to indicate an orderly manner for considering and determining
such cases." Waina v. Pennsylvania Co., 251 Pa. 213 at 221, 96 A. 461 (1915).
This is the best statement of the instruction to the jury the writer has found.
99 See for example Waterford Lumber Co. v. Jacobs, 132 Miss. 638, 97 S. 187 (1923);
Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss. 388, 160 S. 732 (1935); Avent v. Tucker,
188 Miss. 207, 194 S. 596 (1940); Engebrecht v. Bradley, 211 Wis. 1, 247 N.W. 451
(1933).
100 See cases cited infra note 112.
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cisions that obviously blundered,101 that the recoverable damages must
be reduced in the proportion which the plaintiff's fault, or the extent of
his departure from the required standard of conduct, bears to the total
fault of plaintiff and defendant; and not in the proportion which the
one bears to the other, or to the extent of the difference between them.
Thus where the plaintiff's estimated negligence is found to be 20%
of the total, and the defendant's 80%, the plaintiff must recover 80%
of his damages, and not 75% or 60%.102
When one seeks to discover from the appellate decisions some
clue as to what juries actually do under the instruction to divide the
damages, the information to be gleaned is disappointingly meagre.
The cases are rather dismal reading. Normally there are a number of
assignments of error, and the one relating to apportionment complains
of some alleged vice in the instruction, which is corrected, or found
not to exist, or not to be prejudicial. Where the amount of the award
is challenged directly, the court often decides that contributory negligence was not so clearly established that it can say as a matter of law
that the jury was wrong in failing to apportion at all;103 or that the
figure found is not so clearly the maximum justified by the evidence
of damages as to indicate that the jury did not follow the instruction.104
101 In Paluczak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640 at 643, 245 N.W. 655 (1932), it was said
that the plaintiff's damages must be diminished ••• "in such ratio as his negligence bears
to the other's." In Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W.
420, 247 N.W. 453 (1933), this statement was withdrawn, and it was _made clear that
the reduction must be in proportion to the combined negligence. Accord, Engebrecht v.
Bradley, 2ll Wis. l, 247 N.W. 451 (1933).
In Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704 (1934), where the ratio was found
to be l to 6, it was said that the damages must be reduced by ¾. The case is out of line
with Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920), and Sgroi
v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355 (1933), which make it
clear that the reduction must be by 3/2.
102Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. ll4, 33 S.Ct. 654 (1913); Waina
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 251 Pa. 213, 96 A. 461 (1915); Anest v. Columbia & P.S. R.
Co., 89 Wash. 609, 154 P. IIOO (1916); Newkirk v. Pryor, (Mo. App. 1916) 183 S.W.
682; Payne v. Lind, 106 Ohio St. 14, 138 N.E. 366 (1922); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Beck, 196 Ind. 238, 145 N.E. 886, 147 N.E. 776 (1925); Cameron v. Union Automobile
Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420, 247 N.W. 453 (1933); Sgroi v. Yellow Cab &
Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355 (1933); Goodman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., 288 ill. App. 320, 7 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937); Buchanan v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co.,
(7th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 576.
103 See, for example, among many cases, Jackson v. Rutledge, 188 Ind. 415, 122 N.E.
579 (1917); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 38 S.Ct. 318 (1918); Matthews
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 54 Cal. App. (2d) 549, 129 P. (2d) 435 (1942); Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Zolliecoffer, 209 Ark. 559, 191 S.W. (2d) 587 (1946); Ericksen v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 234 P. (2d) 279 (Cal. 1951); Price v. McNeill, 237 Iowa ll20, 24 N.W.
(2d) 464 (1946); Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal. 1952) 246 P. (2d) 642.
104 See for example, among many cases, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wene, (7th Cir.
1913) 202 F. 887; Burke v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 131 Minn. 209, 154 N.W. 960
(19~5); Godby v. Wilson, 203 ill. App. 612 (1916); Ruppell v. New York Central R.
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In these cases it is quite clear that the court simply does not know what
the jury did, and in some instances it has said so franl<ly.105
There are, however, a good many cases in which the contributory
negligence has been clear as a matter of law, and the sum awarded so
definitely equal to the II?,aximum which the evidence would justify
that there could be no doubt that the jury did not make the apportionment. Occasionally a new trial has been ordered;106 more commonly
a remittitur.107 It is difficult to escape the impression that the number
of these cases is disproportionately large, and greatly exceeds what is
normally to be expected on the issue of damages alone. They appear
to lend a great deal of support to the assertion that the jury is not always
to be trusted, with an injured man before it, to follow instructions and
divide the damages, even where the plaintiff is undoubtedly at fault.
They suggest that there must be many more cases in which the apportionment should have been made but was not in fact made, and the
Co., 171 App. Div. 832, 157 N.Y.S. 1095 (1916); Ames v. Western Pac. R. Co., 48
Nev. 78, 227 P. 1009 (1924); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. White, (Va. 1931) 160 S.E. 218;
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 130 Tex. 338, 109 S.W. (2d) 160 (1937) affirming

(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 81 S.W. (2d) 200; Tampa Electric R. Co. v. Hardy, 139 Fla. 142,
190 S. 478 (1939); Katela v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (6th Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d)
842; Powell v. Proctor, 143 Fla. 153, 196 S. 419 (1940); Metz v. Southern Pac. Co.,
(Cal. 1942) 124 P. (2d) 670.
105 See for example New York Central & H.R. R. Co. v. Banker, (2d Cir. 1915) 224
F. 351; Katela v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (6th Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 842.
106 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hobbs, 71 Fla. 109, 70 S. 939 (1916); Seifferman
v. Leach, 161 Miss. 853, 138 S. 563 (1932). See also Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Hardy,
152 Va. 783, 148 S.E. 839 (1929), where there was testimony of jurymen that they did
not apportion.
107 See, for example, among many cases, Cain v. Southern R. Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1911)
199 F. 211; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Weir, 63 Fla. 69, 58 S. 641 (1912); Pyles v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 97 Kan. 455, 155 P. 788 (1916); Yazoo & M.V. R. Co. v.
Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 S. 835 (1917); Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Meacham, 77
Fla. 701, 82 S. 232 (1919); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Conant, 79 Fla. 668, 84 S. 688
(1920); Tallahala Lumber Co. v. Holliman, 125 Miss. 308, 87 S. 661 (1921); Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Harrison, 84 Fla. 497, 94 S. 382 (1922); Tampa Electric Co. v. Llmpus,
83 Fla. 537, 91 S. 559 (1922); Johnson v. Union Pac. R. Co., Ill Neb. 196, 196 N.W.
140 (1923); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Holley, 142 Miss. 241, 106 S. 822
(1926); Tampa Electric Co. v. Knowles, 91 Fla. 1032, 109 S. 219 (1926); Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 S. 95 (1929); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v.
Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 S. 719 (1931); Key West Electric Co. v. Higgs, 118 Fla. 11,
136 S. 639 (1931); Tampa Electric Co. v. Bryant, 101 Fla. 204, 133 S. 887 (1931);
Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140 S. 196, on rehearing 104 Fla.
371, 142 S. 909 (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Fogleman, (Fla. 1934) 158 S. 108;
Gulf & S.I. R. Co. v. Bond, 181 Miss. 254, 179 S. 355, 181 S. 741 (1938); E. L. Bruce
Co. v. Bramlett, (Miss. 1939) 188 S. 532; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Grizzard, 238 Ala.
49, 189 S. 203 (1939); Fegan v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 198 La. 312, 3 S. (2d) 632 (1941);
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Haigler, 203 Ark. 804, 158 S.W. (2d) 703 (1944); Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 S. (2d) 765 (1944); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Yandell, 209 Ark. 569, 191 S.W. (2d) 592 (1946); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mangum,
250 Ala. 431, 34 S. (2d) 848 (1948).
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court is powerless to interfere because it does not know or cannot prove
what has happened. At least the confessed ignorance, in so many
cases, of what the jury has done gives a great deal of color to that claim.
The fear of such misbehavior of the jury has played a considerable
part in the limitations which a number of the states have placed upon
the application of their apportionment acts. They are all more or less
obvious compromises between contesting groups in the legislature,
which go part of the way along the road to apportionment, but endeavor
to stop short at some point where the distrust of the jury becomes acute,
or where agreement can be reached. They are, in other words, political
in character; and like most political compromises, they are remarkable
neither for soundness in principle nor success in operation.

"Slight" and "Gross" Negligence
The oldest of these restrictions is that the damages shall be divided
only where the negligence of the plaintiff is found to be "slight," and
that of the defendant greater in comparison. The limitation traces
back to the old idea that there are "degrees" of negligence, which developed in England in the law of bailments,1° 8 and still is applied in
bailment cases by a number of American courts.109 Shortly after the
middle of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court of Illinois extended this idea to a case of personal injury at the hands of a railroad,110 and from that decision developed the doctrine that the negligence of the plaintiff would not bar his recovery if it was "slight," in
the sense of "a degree of negligence less than a failure to exercise
ordinary care,"111 while the negligence of the defendant was "gross"
in comparison.112 No attempt was made to divide the damages under
this "comparative negligence" rule, and where it was applied the effect
was full recovery by the plaintiff.
108 Coggs v. Bernard,

2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1704); JoNBs, EssAY ON
I.Aw OF BAILMENTs, 3d ed., 1-36 (1828). See Elliott, ''Degrees of Negligence," 6
So. CAL. L. REv. 91 at 107-122 (1932).
109 See, for example, Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 506 (1919);
Lyons First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N.Y. 278, 19 Am. Rep. 181 (1875); Dudley v. Camden & P.F. R. Co., 42 N.J.L. 25, 36 Am. Rep. 501 (1880); Cadwell v. Peninsular State Bank, 195 Mich. 407, 162 N.W. 89 (1917).
110 Galena & Chicago Union R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 ill. 478 (1858).
111 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Moran, 13 ill. App. 72 at 76 (1883). Recovery
was denied if the plaintiff had failed to exercise "ordinary care." City of Chicago v. Stearns,
105 ill. 554 (1883); Schmidt v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 83 ill. 405 (1876); Hund v.
Geier, 72-lli. 393 (1874); Grand Tower M. & T. Co. v. Hawkins, 72 ill. 386 (1874);
St. Louis & S.E. R. Co. v. Britz, 72 ill. 256 (1874).
112 Recovery was also denied if the plaintiff's negligence was found to equal that of
the defendant. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Evans, 88 ill. 63 (1878).
THB
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The result was that for some thirty years the courts of Illinois
were filled with cases which fought out the issue of "slight" and
"gross,"113 in the midst of a turmoil of confusion.114 As a mere matter
of definition the distinction proved to be unworkable, and it broke
down under the sheer weight of the difficulty of applying the bailment
rule to the complications of other negligence cases,115 the multitudinous
appeals, and the high proportion of reversals because of some error of
the trial court.116 Finally the Illinois court lost all patience, and proceeded to whittle away the doctrine,117 and at last to do away with it
entirely.11 8 No trace of it remains in that state.119 Kansas, in the
eighties, followed exactly the same path, attempting the same experiment with "slight" and "gross" negligence,1 20 and repudiating it in
the same way.121 Early ventures in the same direction in Oregon,122
Wisconsin,1 23 and Tennessee124 died more or less by default.
113 See, among many other cases, St. Louis A. & T.H. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409
(1865); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Payne, 59 Ill. 534 (1871); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Cragin, 71 Ill. 177 (1873); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hall, 72 Ill. 222 (1874); Chicago &
A. R. Co. v. Mock, 72 Ill. 141 (1874); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill. 347
(1874); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 Ill. 567 (1874); Schmidt v. Chicago & N.W.
R. Co., 83 Ill. 405 (1876); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hammer, 85 Ill. 526 (1877); Wabash
R. Co. v. Henlcs, 91 Ill. 406 (1879).
114 Described in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512 (1882); Chicago,
R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N.E. 705 (1905).
115 Green, ''Illinois Negligence Law," 39 ILI.. L. RBv. 36 at 51 (1944), suggests the
further reason that the great increase in cases of injuries to employees would have resulted
in heavier liability on employers than the courts were willing to impose. Elliott, "Degrees
of Negligence," 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 91 at 136 (1933), suggests also the very hostile reception of the Illinois doctrine at the hands of other courts and text writers. There is an
excellent review of the whole history in Malone, ''The Formative Era of Contributory
Negligence," 41 ILI.. L. REv. 151 (1946).
116 An extended, but incomplete, list of such reversals is found in Calumet hon &
Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885).
111 Calumet hon & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885); Chicago &
E.I. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N.E. 263 (1887); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Warner, 123 Ill. 38, 14 N.E. 206 (1887); Village of Mansfield v. Moore, 124 Ill. 133,
16 N.E. 246 (1888).
11s Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894).
119 City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Cicero St. R.
Co. v. Meixner, 160 Ill. 320, 43 N.E. 823 (1896); City of Macomb v. Holcomb, 205 Ill.
643, 69 N.E. 79 (1903); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N.E. 705
(1905); Krieger v. Aurora, E. & C. R. Co., 242 Ill. 544, 90 N.E. 266 (1909).
120 Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466 (1872); Pacific R. Co. v. Houts, 12 Kan. 328
(1873); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 36 Kan. 565, 14 P. 1 (1883); Wichita & W. R.
Co. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78 (1887).
121 Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77 at 80, 1 P. 298 (1883);
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Walters, 78 Kan. 39, 96 P. 346 (1908); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.
Co. v. Henry, 57 Kan. 154, 45 P. 576 (1896); Sayeg v. Kansas City Gas & Electric Co.,
156 Kan. 65, 131 P. (2d) 648 (1942).
122 Bequette v. People's Transp. Co., 2 Ore. 200 (1867); Holstine v. Oregon & Cal.
R. Co., 8 Ore. 163 (1879). But in Hamerlynck v. Banfield, 36 Ore. 436, 59 P. 712
(1900), without reference to the earlier cases, the court stated the common law contributory negligence rule, which has been followed ever since.
123 In Stucke v. Milwaukee & Miss. R. Co., 9 Wis. 202 (1859); Dreher v. Town of
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Nevertheless, when proposals for the apportionment of damages
reached the legislatures, the memory of these old common law fiascoes
remained to suggest a possible basis for compromise. As a result the
railroad employers' liability acts of the District of Columbia,1 2 ~ Nebraska,126 and Ohio,1 27 as well as broader labor acts in Alaska,1 28
Califomia129 and Ohio,1 80 carry provisions for apportionment only if
the plaintiff's negligence is found to be "slight," so that the defendant's
is "gross" in comparison. The same was true of a Wisconsin statute,1 81
now repealed,1 82 which covered injuries inflicted by a railroad. In 1913
Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 643 (1868); Hammond v. Town of Mukwa, 40 Wis. 35 (1876);
Griffin v. Town of Willow, 43 Wis. 509 (1878); and Ditbemer v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co., 47 Wis. 138, 2 N.W. 69 (1879), it was said that slight negligence, defined as
want of extraordinary care, would not bar the plaintiff's recovery. But in Potter v. Chicago
& N.W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 377, 94 Am. Dec. 548 (1867), and Cunningham v. Lyness, 22
Wis. 236 (1867), it was held that any way of ordinary care, however slight, would be a
bar; and in Bolin v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 108 Wis. 333, 84 N.W. 446 (1900),
the court, after reviewing the cases, rejected the whole idea of comparative negligence.
124 Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head (38 Tenn.) 610 at 623 (1858); East Tenn. R,
Co. v. Fain, 12 Lea (80 Tenn.) 35 at 40 (1883); East Tenn. R. Co. v. Gurley, 12 Lea
(80 Tenn.) 46 at 55 (1883). In East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 12
S.W. 419 (1889), the court expressly repudiated the idea of comparative negligence, and
explained that it had been talking about "remote" negligence and proximate cause. See
text infra at notes 189-192.
125 D.C.
12a Neb.

Code (1940) tit. 44, §402.
Rev. Stat. (1943) §74-704. Applied in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Castle, (8th
Cir. 1909) 172 F. 841, affirmed and held constitutional in 224 U.S. 541, 32 S.Ct. 606
(1912). See Jackson v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., (8th Cir. 1910) 178 F. 432; Chicago,
R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Wright, 239 U.S. 548, 36 S.Ct. 185 (1915).
127 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1945) §9018. Applied in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.
v. McTeer, 55 Ohio App. 217, 9 N.E. (2d) 627 (1936); Detroit & T.S.L. R. Co. v.
Seigel, (Ohio App. 1926) 153 N.E. 870; Ross v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 40 Ohio App.
447, 178 N.E. 852 (1931); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Riggs, (6th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d)
612; Erie R. Co. v. White, (6th Cir. 1911) 187 F. 556.
128 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §43-2-52, applicable to certain hazardous occupations.
129 Cal. Labor Code (1937) §2801, applicable to all employees. Applied in Lassen
v. Southern Pac. Co., 173 Cal. 71, 159 P. 143 (1916); Tubbs v. Stone & Webster Const.
Co., 30 Cal. App. 705, 159 P. 242 (1916); Bruce v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 177 Cal.
25, 169 P. 660 (1917); Scherer v. Danziger, 178 Cal. 253, 173 P. 85 (1918). See
Mantonya v. Bratlie, (Cal. App. 1948) 190 P. (2d) 996, reversed on other grounds in 33
Cal. (2d) 120, 199 P. (2d) 677 (1948); Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. (2d)
802, 167 P. (2d) 729 (1945).
130 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1945) §6245-1, applicable to all employees. Applied
in Standard Steel Tube Co. v. Prusakicueicz, 33 Ohio C.C. 133 (1911), affirmed in 87
Ohio St. 472, 102 N.E. 1131 (1911); McKee v. New Idea, Inc., (Ohio App. 1942) 44
N.E. (2d) 697; Zeis v. Kaechele, 29 Ohio App. 54, 163 N.E. 42 (1927); see McMyler
Mfg. Co. v. Mehnke, (6th Cir. 1913) 209 F. 5; Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169
N.E. 291 (1929).
131 Wis. Stat. (1949) §192.29(6). Applied in Gordon v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 168
Wis. 244, 169 N.W. 570 (1918); Clark v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 214 Wis.
295, 252 N.W. 685 (1934).
182 In 1951, as in conflict with Wisconsin's broader apportionment act (infra, text at
note 156). See Lipscomb, "Comparative Negligence," INs. L.J. No. 344, 667 at 674
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Nebraska133 extended this to divide the damages, subject to the same
limitation, in all actions for personal injuries or damage to property;
and in 1941 the Nebraska act was copied in South Dakota.134
The result of the limitation has been to a considerable extent a
repetition of the Illinois experience. Appeals have multiplied, in which
the court is asked to decide whether particular conduct of the plaintiff
is, under the circumstances, more than "slight" negligence. "Slight" is
the key word, since it is agreed that if the plaintiff's fault does not
meet that qualification, the greater negligence of the defendant still
will not permit any recovery.135 The Nebraska court has refused to
define the term, saying that "any one of common sense knows that
slight negligence actually means small or little negligence, and gross
negligence means just what it indicates, gross or great negligence";136
and South Dakota has done little better, saying that slight negligence
means merely "ordinary negligence, small in quantum."137
Counsel have not been slow to accept this invitation to argue the
issue. The great majority of the appeals have resulted in a decision
that the contributory negligence was more than "slight," and all recovery was barred even though the defendant's negligence was the
greater of the two; so that the limitation has had the effect of restricting apportionment to a relatively small number of cases. Recovery
(Sept. 1951). It has been held that the railroad act was superseded by the broader statute
where the negligence of the plaintiff was more than slight. Hammer v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S.S.M. R. Co., 216 Wis. 7, 255 N.W. 124 (1934).
183Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §25-1151: ''In all actions brought to recover damages to
a person or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff
may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was
gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered
by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of the contributory
negligence attributable to the plaintiff.''
See Wiebusch, "Comparative Negligence in Nebraska," 17 NEB, L.B. 68 (1938);
Baylor, "Comparative Negligence in Nebraska," 10 S.D. B.J. 146 (1942).
134 S.D. Laws 1941, c. 160, p. 184.
135 Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920); Mitchell
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 114 Neb. 72, 206 N.W. 12 (1925); McDonald v. Wright, 125
Neb. 871, 252 N.W. 411 (1934); Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 152 Neb. 39, 40
N.W. (2d) 252 (1949), affirmed in 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W. (2d) 609 (1950); Friese v.
Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W. (2d) 438 (1943); Roberts v. Brown, 72 S.D. 479,
36 N.W. (2d) 665 (1949); Will v. Marquette, (S.D. 1949) 40 N.W. (2d) 396. Once
the plaintiff's negligence is found to be slight, the defendant's negligence need not be
"gross" in itself, but only greater in comparison with that of. the plaintiff. Roby v. Auker,
151 Neb. 421, 37 N.W. (2d) 799 (1949).
The Nebraska act has been held to apply where the defendant's negligence was
"gross" within the automobile guest statute. Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.
(2d) 82 (1943), overruling Sheehy v. Abboud, 126 Neb. 554, 253 N.W. 683 (1934).
136 Monasmith v. Cosden Oil Co., 124 Neb. 327, 246 N.W. 623 (1933).
1a1 Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W. (2d) 438 (1943).
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has been denied, for example, where the plaintiff has failed to stop,
look and listen at a railroad crossing,138 or to look or to stop or to see
what was visible at an intersection,1 39 or to drive at a reasonable
speed,1 40 or at such a speed that he could stop within his range of
vision,1 41 or to reduce his speed at the appearance of a visible
danger,142 or to avoid a vehicle when crossing the street,1 43 as well
l38 Seiffert v. Hines, 108 Neb. 62, 187 N.W. 108 (1922); Haffke v. Missouri Pac.
R. Corp., 110 Neb. 125, 193 N.W. 257 (1923); Stanley v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 113
Neb. 280, 202 N.W. 864 (1925); Tyson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 113 Neb. 504, 203
N.W. 560 (1925); Allen v. Omaha & S.I. R. Co., 115 Neb. 221, 212 N.W. 428 (1927);
Eggeling v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 119 Neb. 229, 228 N.W. 361, 231 N.W. 152
(1929); Rogers v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., (8th Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 601; Mundt v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 136 Neb. 478, 286 N.W. 691 (1939); _Fischer v. Megan, 138
Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287 (1940); Johnson v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 71 S.D. 132, 22
N.W. (2d) 725 (1946).
The issue was held to be for the jw:y in Traphagen .v. Lincoln Traction Co., 110
Neb. 855, 195 N.W. 472 (1923); Baker v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 110 Neb. 246,
193 N.W. 341 (1923); Gordon v. lliinois Cent. R. Co., 168 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 570
(1918); Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 214 Wis. 295, 252 N.W. 685 (1934).
139 McDonald v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 128 Neb. 17, 257 N.W. 489 (1934);
Nelson v. Plautz, 130 Neb. 641, 265 N.W. 885 (1936); Bergendahl v. Rabeler, 133 Neb.
699, 276 N.W. 673 (1937); Ritter v. Hering, 135 Neb. 1, 280 N.W. 231 (1938); Whittaker v. Hanifin, 138 Neb. 18, 291 N.W. 723 (1940); Klement v. Lindell, 139 Neb. 540,
298 N.W. 137 (1941); Kundert v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 70 S.D. 464, 18 N.W. (2d) 786
(1945); Flanagan v. Slattery, (S.D. 1951) 49 N.W. (2d) 27; Huckfeldt v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 154 Neb. 873, 50 N.W. (2d) 110 (1951).
The issue was held to be for the jw:y in Anderbery v. Katz, 142 Neb. 872, 8 N.W.
(2d) 207 (1943); Sgroi v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355
(1933). Miscalculation of the speed of an approaching vehicle was held to be for the jw:y
in Burton v. Lincoln Traction Co., 106 Neb. 521, 184 N.W. 73 (1921); Coburn v.
Loetscher, 123 Neb. 407, 243 N.W. 127 (1932).
140 Anderson v. Altschuler, 125 Neb. 853, 252 N.W. 310 (1934). In Patterson v.
Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704 (1934), the issue was held to be for the jw:y.
141 Dickenson v. County of Cheyenne, 146 Neb. 36, 18 N.W. (2d) 559 (1945).
The issue was held to be for the jw:y in Day v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 115 Neb.
711, 214 N.W. 647 (1927); Monasmith v. Cosden· Oil Co., 124 Neb. 327, 246 N.W.
623 (1933). In Pierson v. Jensen, 148 Neb. 849, 29 N.W. (2d) 625 (1947), the court
at first held this to be more than slight as a matter of law, but on rehearing, in 150 Neb.
86, 33 N.W. (2d) 462 (1948), vacated the decision and left the issue to the jw:y. In
Giles v. Welsh, 122 Neb. 164, 239 N.W. 813 (1931), and Audiss v. Peter Kiewit Sons
Co., (8th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 238, failure to see an object in the highway not too
clearly visible was held to be for the jw:y.
142 Stocker v. Roach, 140 Neb. 461, 300 N.W. 627 (1941); Chana v. Mannlein,
141 Neb. 312, 3 N.W. (2d) 572 (1942); Donald v. Heller, 143 Neb. 600, 10 N.W.
(2d) 447 (1943); Doane v. Hoppe, 132 Neb. 641, 272 N.W. 763 (1937); Redwelski
v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 137 Neb. 681, 290 N.W. 904 (1940).
143Dodds v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 104 Neb. 692, 178 N.W. 258 (1920); Troup
v. Porter, 126 Neb. 93, 252 N.W. 611 (1934); Travinsky v. Omaha & C.B.St. R. Co.,
137 Neb. 168, 288 N.W. 512 (1939); Hughes v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 143 Neb. 47,
8 N.W. (2d) 509 (1943); Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179, 22 N.W. (2d) 614
(1946); cf. Chew v. Coffin, 144 Neb. 170, 12 N.W. (2d) 839 (1944) (pedestrian on
sidewalk oblivious of car backing out of driveway).
The issue was held to be for the jw:y in Francis v. Lincoln Traction Co., 106 Neb.
243, 183 N.W. 293 (1921); Belville v. Bondesson, 130 Neb. 926, 266 N.W. 901 (1936);
Thompson v. Buehler, 147 Neb. 811, 25 N.W. (2d) 391 (1946).
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as in many other instances of rather ordinary negligence.144 At the
same time it is clear that "slight" is a matter of all the circumstances of
the particular case, so that there can be no definite rules; and there are
other cases1 45 in which conduct of the same kind is held to present a
question for the jury. It is, of course, not at all surprising that the
appeals continue.
The Nebraska system does not inspire confidence in a stranger
to the state. It seems quite apparent that it leads to confusion, and to
excessive appeals; and that it results in apportionment in only a relatively small fraction of the cases in which it should be made.
Plaintiff's Negligence "Less" Than Defendant's

A second type of limitation is that there can be apportionment
only when the plaintiff's negligence is found to be "less" than that of
the defendant, and that if it is equal or greater all recovery is barred.
This first appeared in Georgia. After some early language at common
law looking in the direction of apportionment,1 46 the Georgia Code
of 1860-62 introduced a provision, applicable only to personal injuries
or damage to property inflicted by a railroad,147 which required division
144 Wertz v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 451, 41 N.W. (2d) 740 (1950)
(window washer failing to fasten safety belt); Sodomka v. Cudahy Packing Co., 101 Neb.
448, 163 N.W. 809 (1917) (backing into elevator shaft); Kudrna v. Sarpy County, 125
Neb. 83, 249 N.W. 87 (1933) (riding with inexperienced driver); Tomjack v. Chicago
& N.W. R. Co., 116 Neb. 413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928) (passenger failing to warn driver
of missing culvert); Frye v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 106 Neb. 333, 183 N.W. 567
(1921) (skating with improper skates and straps); Haase v. Willers Truck Service, 72 S.D.
353, 34 N.W. (2d) 313 (1948) (obstructing highway with truck); Roger Wurmser, Inc.
v. Interstate Hotel Co., 148 Neb. 660, 28 N.W. (2d) 405 (1947) (failure to inform
hotel of $200,000 value of jewels); Bixby v. Ayers, 139 Neb. 652, 298 N.W. 533 (1941)
(boy turning bicycle into path of car); Gardner v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 134
Neb. 163, 278 N.W. 137 (1938) (falling into open stairway); Eaton v. Merritt, 135 Neb.
363, 281 N.W. 620 (1938) (standing behind truck in excavation); Wentink v. Traphagen, 138 Neb. 41, 291 N.W. 884 (1940) (proceeding in dark basement); Groat v.
Clausen, 139 Neb. 689, 298 N.W. 563 (1941) (getting too close to ensilage cutter).
The following were held to be for the jury: La Fleur v. Poesch, 126 Neb. 263, 252
N.W. 902 (1934) (standing in front of stalled truck on highway without required red light);
Disher v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 93 Neb. 224, 140 N.W. 135 (1913) (attempting
to remove handcar from track in path of train); McCarthy v. Village of Ravenna, 99 Neb.
674, 157 N.W. 629 (1916) (using short handled brush around machinery in motion).
145 See cases cited in notes 146-152.
146 Jn Macon & Western R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 at 254 (1858); Macon & W. R.
Co. v. Davis, 27 Ga. 113 at 119 (1859); Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358 at 362 (1859).
The history is well traced in Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 Cm-KENT
L. Rav. 189, 304, 326-333 (1950).
147Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §94-703: "No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where the same is done by his consent
or is caused by his own negligence. If the complainant and the agents of the company are
both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of fault attributable to him."
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of the damages. By a rather remarkable process of construction, not
justified by anything appearing in the provision itself,148 it was first
of all extended to actions against other defendants than railroads,1 49
and then limited to cases where the plaintiff's negligence was "less."150
One looks in vain for any explanation of the limitation,1111 and it
appears to have arisen from nothing more than timidity in the application of the statute.
Half a century of Georgia history suggested this compromise too
to other legislatures, and it was adopted in the railroad employers' liability acts of Arkansas,1 52 Michigan153 and Wisconsin,154 in which
"slight''negligence does not even go to reduce the damages; and in an
apportionment act in Arkansas1 55 which covers all personal injuries
inflicted by a railroad. In 1913 Wisconsin carried the limitation
over into its general statute providing for apportionment in all cases
of negligent personal injury or property damage.156
148 When Florida copied the Georgia act, it refused to accept the limitation. Florida,
C. & P.R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 S. 338 (1899).
149 Berry v. Jowers, 59 Ga. App. 24, 200 S.E. 195 (1938); Elk Cotton Mills v.
Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913);.Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 159 Ga.
623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Ga. App. 185, 172 S.E.
680 (1934); Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 125 S.E. 907 (1924); City of Ocilla v.
Luke, 28 Ga. App. 234, 110 S.E. 757 (1922).
150 Christian v. Macon R. Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S.E. 923 (1904); Brunswick R. Co.
v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 39 S.E. 551 (1901); Southern Stages, Inc. v. Clements, 71 Ga.
App. 169, 30 S.E. (2d) 429 (1944); Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S.E. (2d)
214 (1941); Southern R. Co. v. Parkman, 61 Ga. App. 62, 5 S.E. (2d) 685 (1939);
Pollard v. Heard, 53 Ga. App. 623, 186 S.E. 894 (1936); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Larsen,
19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S.E. 517 (1917).
151 The limitation appears to have originated in Central R. & B. Co. v. Newman,
94 Ga. 560, 21 S.E. 219 (1894), where the facts were stated, and the court reversed without an opinion. This case was relied on, and the rule first stated, in Southern R. Co. v.
Watson, 104 Ga. 243, 30 S.E. 818 (1898), where the only reason given was that the rule
was established. Both cases were followed, with no better explanation, in Brunswick R.
Co. v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 39 S.E. 501 (1901).
152 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1942) §73-916. Applied in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Brown, 195
Ark. 1060, 115 S.W. (2d) 1083 (1938); Kansas City & M. R. Co. v. Huff, 116 Ark. 461,
173 s.w. 419 (1915).
153 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §419.52. Applied in Bruce v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.,
172 Mich. 441, 138 N.W. 362 (1912); English v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 188 Mich.
286, 154 N.W. 98 (1915).
154 Wis. Stat. (1949) §192.50 (3). Applied in Zeratsky v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co., 141 Wis. 423, 123 N.W. 904 (1909); Jensen v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 145 Wis.
326, 128 N.W. 982 (1910); Tidmarsh v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 149 Wis. 590,
136 N.W. 337 (1912).
155 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §73-1004. Applied in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 155 Ark. 632, 245 S.W. 35 (1922); St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v.
Hovley, 199 Ark. 853, 137 S.W. (2d) 231 (1940); Phillips v. Kum, (8th Cir. 1944)
145 F. (2d) 908. The act has no application to property damage. Baldwin v. Waters,
191 Ark. 377, 86 S.W. (2d) 172 (1935); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Binkley, 208 Ark. 933,
188 s.w. (2d) 291 (1945).
·
156Wis. Stat. (1949) §331.045: "Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in
an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence re-
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The practical effect has been very similar to that of "slight" and
"gross" negligence. Again appeals have multiplied, in which the court
is asked to determine whether the particular conduct of the plaintiff
is fault at least "equal" to that of the defendant. Since this must depend not only upon all the circumstances of the case as they affect the
conduct of both parties, but upon a comparison of one with the other,
it is obvious that each decision must be upon the individual facts, and
that either the losing defendant or the losing plaintiff has ample encouragement to raise the issue. It is not surprising that there is no
semblance of consistency to be discerned in cases of the same general
type. In about half of the cases in which the plaintiff has driven onto a
railroad crossing without stopping, looking, listening, reducing speed
or seeing a visible train, his negligence has been held at least equal
as a matter of law to that of the railroad in failing to give proper
warning.1117 In about as many cases it has been held that the jury may
find that the plaintiff's negligence is the lesser of the two.1118 The same
sulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering."
See Padway, "Comparative Negligence," 16 MARQ. L. REv. 3 (1931); Campbell,
"Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis. L. REv. 222 (1932); Whelan, "Comparative Negligence Statute," 20 MARQ. L. REv. 189 (1936); Whelan, "Comparative Negligence," [1938] Wis. L. REv. 465; Campbell, "Ten Years of Comparative Negligence,"
[1941] Wis. L. REv. 289; Hayes, ''Rule of Comparative Negligence and its Operation in
Wisconsin," 23 Omo S.B.A. REP. 233 (1950); Grubb, "Observations on Comparative
Negligence," 23 Omo S.B.A. REP. 237 (1950).
1111 Bradley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (8th Cir. 1923) 288 F. 484; Jemell v. St. Louis
S.W. R. Co., 178 Ark. 578, 11 S.W. (2d) 449 (1928); Zenner v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
O. R. Co., 219 Wis. 124, 262 N.W. 581 (1935); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Davis, 197 Ark.
830, 125 S.W. (2d) 785 (1939); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Price, 199 Ark. 346, 133 S.W.
(2d) 645 (1939); Patterson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 236 Wis. 205, 294 N.W.
63 (1940); Evanich v. Milwaukee Blee. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. lll, 295 N.W. 44 (1941);
McGlothin v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 708, 148 S.W. (2d) 558 (1941) (reviewing the confusion in the Arkansas cases); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Carruthers, 204 Ark. 419, 162 S.W.
(2d) 912 (1942); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Howard, 204 Ark. 253, 161 S.W. (2d) 759
(1942); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Dennis, 205 Ark. 28, 166 S.W. (2d) 886 (1942); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Dawson, 205 Ark. 404, 168 S.W. (2d) ll05 (1943); Lloyd v. St.
Louis S.W. R. Co., 207 Ark. 154, 179 S.W. (2d) 651 (1944); Snyder v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 183 Tenn. 471, 192 S.W. (2d) 1008 (1946); Tepe! v. Thompson, 359 Mo. I,
220 s.w. (2d) 23 (1949).
158 Memphis, D. & G. R. Co. v. Thompson, 138 Ark. 175, 210 S.W. 346 (1919);
Powell v. Jonesboro, L.C. & E. R. Co., 166 Ark. 252, 266 S.W. 78 (1924); Huff v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 170 Ark. 665, 280 S.W. 648 (1926); Chicago, R.I. & P. Co. v.
French, 181 Ark. 777, 27 S.W. (2d) 1021 (1930); Southern R. Co. v. Wilbanks, (5th
Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 424; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Brown, 187 Ark. 1163, 59 S.W. (2d)
34 (1933); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Westerfield, 192 Ark. 558, 92 S.W. (2d) 862 (1936);
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Dotson, 195 Ark. 286, IOI S.W. (2d) 785 (1937); Thomas v.
Southern R. Co., (5th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 445; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henderson,
194 Ark. 884, ll0 S.W. (2d) 516 (1937) (passenger failing to warn driver); St. Lbuis-
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kind of variation is found in cases of a pedestrian walking into the
path of a train,1 59 or a vehicle whose driver has failed in his duty as
to speed, warning or lookout;160 a trespasser on the right of way struck
by a train;161 the various kinds of negligence of drivers colliding at
intersections;162 and miscellaneous other situations.163 The Georgia
courts have displayed a remarkable tendency to leave the issue to the
San Francisco R. Co. v. Hovley, 199 Ark. 853, 137 S.W. (2d) 231 (1940); St. LouisSan Francisco R. Co. v. Beasley, 205 Ark. 688, 170 S.W. (2d) 667 (1943); Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Walden, 207 Ark. 437, 181 S.W. (2d) 24 (1944); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v.
Shell, 208 Ark. 70, 185 S.W. (2d) 81 (1945); Smith v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 208 Ark.
40, 184 S.W. (2d) 951 (1945); Webster v. Roth, 246 Wis. 535, 18 N.W. (2d) 1 (1945).
1159 Held at least equal as a matter of law in Southern R. Co. v. Parkman, 61 Ga. App.
62, 5 S.E. (2d) 685 (1939); Allnutt v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (8th Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d)
604. Held for the jury in Missouri Pac. R. v. Trotter, 184 Ark. 790, 43 S.W. (2d) 762
(1931); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Rogers, 184 Ark. 725, 43 S.W. (2d) 757 (1931).
l60 Held equal as a matter of law in Burant v. Studzinski, 230 Wis. 455, 282 N.W.
3 (1938); Rustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N.W. 595 (1938); Nayes v. Milwaukee
Elec. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. 141, 294 N.W. 812 (1940); Post v.·Thomas, 240 Wis. 519,
3 N.W. (2d) 344 (1942); Crawley v. Hill, 253 Wis. 294, 34 N.W. (2d) 123 (1948);
Ninneman v. Schwede, 258 Wis. 408, 46 N.W. (2d) 230 (1951).
Held for the jury in De Goey v. Hermsen, 233 Wis. 69, 288 N.W. 770 (1939);
Wilson v. Pollard, 62 Ga. App. 781, 10 S.E. (2d) 407 (1940); Doepke v. Reimer, 217
Wis. 49, 258 N.W. 345 (1935); Schwandt v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & T. Co., 244 Wis.
251, 12 N.W. (2d) 18 (1943); Kleiner v. Johnson, 249 Wis. 148, 23 N.W. (2d) 467
(1946); Baggett -v. Jackson, 79 Ga. App. 460, 54 S.E. (2d) 146 _(1949).
161 Held equal as -a matter of law in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Williams, 180
Ark. 413, 21 S.W. (2d) 611 (1929). Held for the jury in Hunt v. Western & A. R. Co.,
49 Ga. App. 33, 174 S.E. 222 (1934).
162 Held equal as a matter of law in Kilcoyne v. Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W.
276 (1936); Grasser v. Anderson, 224 Wis. 654, 273 N.W. 63 (1937); Langworthy v.
Reisinger, 249 Wis. 24, 23 N.W. (2d) 482 (1946); Geyer v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L.
Co., 230 Wis. 347, 284 N.W. 1 (1939); Campanelli v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & T. Co.,
242 Wis. 505, 8 N.W. (2d) 390 (1943); J. W. Cartage Co. v. Laufenberg, 251 Wis. 301,
28 N.W. (2d) 925 (1947); Kloss v. American Indemnity Co., 253 Wis. 476, 34 N.W.
(2d) 816 (1948); Dinger v. McCoy Transp. Co., 254 Wis. 447, 37 N.W. (2d) 26 (1949).
Held for the jury in Paluczak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 655 (1932); Head
v. Georgia Power Co., 70 Ga. App. 32, 27 S.E. (2d) 339 (1943).
163 Held equal as a matter of law: Manitowoc Trust Co. v. Bouril, 220 Wis. 627, 265
N.W. 572 (1936) (plaintiff on running board of defendant's automobile); Schulz v. General Cas. Co., 233 Wis. 118, 288 N.W. 803 (1939) (two motorists approaching top of
hill in middle of road; plaintiff reduced speed and defendant did not); Konow v. Gruenwald, 241 Wis. 453, 6 N.W. (2d) 208 (1942) (head-on collision, plaintiff on wrong side);
Piesik v. Deuster, 243 Wis. 598, 11 N.W. (2d) 358 (1943) (head-on collision, both
drivers over center line); Saley v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 246 Wis. 647, 18 N.W.
(2d) 342 (1945) (plaintiff on wrong side, defendant driving at excessive speed); McCord
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (5th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 603 (riding with intoxicated
driver, collision with train); Phillips v. Haring, (Wis. 1952) 54 N.W. (2d) 200 (rear end
collision).
Held for the jury: Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939) (both
drivers on wrong side, too fast and no lookout); Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Loudermilk,
(5th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 596 (turning into path of speeding bus); United States v.
Fleming, (5th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 314 (unable to stop within range of vision, collision
with unlighted vehicle parked on highway); McDowall Transport, Inc. v. Gault, 80 Ga.
App. 445, 56 S.E. (2d) 161 (1949) (same); Engebrecht v. Bradley, 211 Wis. 1, 247
N.W. 451 (1933) (same).
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jury in all cases,164 and in effect have nullified the limitation except
as an element of the instructions.
Wisconsin at one time attempted to state some kind of rule by
saying that negligence of the same kind, as where both parties failed
to keep a proper lookout, would be treated as equal,165 but that where
the parties were at fault in different respects, as where failure to look
out must be balanced against excessive speed, the court could not rule
and the issue must be left to the jury.166 It has been compelled to
retreat from that position, and to recognize not only that juries may
find that negligence of the same kind differs in degree,1 67 but also
that the plaintiff's negligence of a different kind may be as a matter
of law at least equal to that of the defendant.168 Likewise where the
plaintiff has been negligent in one respect and the defendant in two or
three, it has been held that the fault is at least equal,1 69 and where the
plaintiff has failed in two or three respects and the defendant in one
the jury has been permitted to find that the plaintiff is still less at

fault.1 70
It is obvious that a slight difference in the proportionate fault may
permit a recovery;171 and there has been much quite justified criticism
l64As, for example, in Lewis v. Powell, 51 Ga. App. 129, 179 S.E. 865 (1935),
where the plaintiff drove into the side of a train.
l65Evanich v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. 111, 295 N.W. 44 (1941);
Langworthy v. Reisinger, 249 Wis. 24, 23 N.W. (2d) 482 (1946); Piesik v. Deuster, 243
Wis. 598, 11 N.W. (2d) 358 (1943).
166 McGuiggan v. Hiller Bros., 209 Wis. 402, 245 N.W. 97 (1932); Brown v. Haertel,
210 Wis. 345, 244 N.W. 630 (1932); Engebrecht v. Bradley, 211 Wis. 1, 247 N.W.
451 (1933); Doepke v. Reimer, 217 Wis. 49,258 N.W. 345 (1935); Callaway v. Kryzen,
228 Wis. 53, 279 N.W. 702 (1938).
167 Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939); Fronczek v. Sink, 235
Wis. 398, 291 N.W. 850, 293 N.W. 153 (1940).
168 Geyer v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., 230 Wis. 347, 284 N.W. 1 (1939); Saley
v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 246 Wis. 647, 18 N.W. (2d) 342 (1945); Dinger v. McCoy
Transp. Co., 254 Wis. 447, 37 N.W. (2d) 26 (1949).
l69 Grasser v. Anderson, 224 Wis. 654, 273 N.W. 63 (1937); Hustad v. Evetts, 230
Wis. 292, 282 N.W. 595 (1938); Rosenow v. Schmidt, 232 Wis. 1, 285 N.W. 755 (1939).
But such facts may justify a jury's conclusion that the plaintiff's fault is less in exact proportion to the number of elements of negligence. Hom v. Snow White Laundry & D.C.
Co., 240 Wis. 312, 3 N.W. (2d) 380 (1942).
170 Schmidt v. Leary, 213 Wis. 587, 252 N.W. 151 (1934); Kirchen v. Tisler, 255
Wis. 208, 38 N.W. (2d) 514 (1949). But the fact that plaintiff has been negligent in
more respects than defendant has been held to require the conclusion that his fault was at
least equal. Kilcoyne v. Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W. 276 (1936); Burant v. Studzinski, 230 Wis. 455, 282 N.W. 3, 128 (1938); Konow v. Gruenwald, 241 Wis. 453,
6 N.W. (2d) 208 (1943).
171 In Head v. Georgia Power Co., 70 Ga. App. 32, 27 S.E. (2d) 339 (1943), and
Hunt v. Western & A. R. Co., 49 Ga. App. 33, 174 S.E. 222 (1934), it was said that a
slight difference in fault would justify recovery of "a small amount"; and in Evans v.
Central of Georgia R. Co., 38 Ga. App. 146, 142 S.E. 909 (1928), a verdict for 12 cents
was upheld on this basis. The Georgia courts evidently were following some unstated
theory of allowing the plaintiff the difference between the proportions of fault.
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of a rule under which a plaintiff who is charged with 49 per cent of
the total negligence recovers 51 per cent of his damages, while one who
is charged with 50 per cent recovers nothing at all.172 Actually, of
course, juries almost never indulge in such refined hair-splitting,173
and the criticism really goes to the directed verdict. It has been said
that the restriction is necessary to prevent the jury from giving the
plaintiff something in every case, even where the defendant may not
be negligent at all, or is at fault to the extent of only 1% of the total.
But this ignores the fact that the court still has control over an unjustified apportionment, and that a 1% recovery will be insignificant, and
less than the nuisance value of the suit. Actually the writer has found
no such cases. It appears impossible to justify the rule on any basis
except one of pure political compromise. It is difficult to be happy
about the Wisconsin cases, or ~o escape the conclusion that at the cost
of many appeals they have succeeded merely in denying apportionment
in many cases where it should have been made.
Proximate Cause

"Proximate cause" has been something of a problem under the
apportionment statutes. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, when
it was first enacted, said nothing about assumption of risk,1 74 and it
was held that that defense remained available to the defendant as a
complete bar to recovery,175 until the act was amended in 1939 to
eliminate it entirely.176 Quite apart from this, the Supreme Court
quite unexpectedly held177 in 1916 that a railroad employee who had
violated a company rule or order was charged with the "primary duty,"
and could not recover, on the ground that his own negligence was
172 See in particular the articles cited in note 156.
173 In special verdict cases the juries, with rare exceptions,

have found"percentages of
fault in even multiples of 5 or 10, or else in simple fractions, such as ¼ or the like.
174 See Peterson, "The Joker in the Federal Employers' Liability Act," 80 CBNT. L.J.
5 (1915); Buford, "Assumption of Risk Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,"
28 HAnv. L. REv. 163 (1914); notes, 32 CoL. L. REv. 1384 (1932); 6 TuLANB L. REv.
315 (1932).
115 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 S.Ct. 635 (1914).
176 "That in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any
of the provisions of this act to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its
employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment
in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; and no employee shall be held
to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such
common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee." 53 Stat. L. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §54. First
applied in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).
111 Great Northern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444, 36 S.Ct. 406 (1916).
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the "sole proximate cause" of his injury, so that the negligence of the
defendant was not to be regarded as contributing at all. The result
was a series of decisions refusing to apportion the damages in the case
of such violations. In one of them the plaintiff had himself ordered
the negligent conduct of a fellow servant for which he was seeking to
recover,1 78 but in others he had merely failed to perform a specific
duty of his own,1 79 or to obey a specific order.180
In 1943 the Supreme Court, quite as unexpectedly, declared181
that the "primary duty" rule was in reality a form of assumption of
risk, which it never had been called before, and that the 1939 amendment had eliminated it. A subsequent decision of the Sixth Circuit,1 82
to which certiorari was denied, has confirmed this conclusion, although
there are still decisions which refuse to accept it. It is idle to comment
on such intellectual gymnastics; but the whole thing is likely to prove
something of a puzzle to future historians, since the rule itself would
appear to be neither required nor justified by anything in the original
statute, and its abolition equally uncalled for by the amendment.
The very questionable "proximate cause" explanation of the last
clear chance183 has resulted in the survival of that doctrine under the
apportionment acts, on the theory that its effect is that the plaintiff's
Unadilla Valley R. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139, 49 S.Ct. 91 (1928).
179Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 44 S.Ct. 1 (1923); Chicago St. P.,
M. & 0. R. Co. v. Arnold, (8th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 1002; Virginian R. Co. v. Linkous,
(4th Cir. 1915) 230 F. 88; Unadilla Valley R. Co. v. Dibble, (2d Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d)
239; Hayes v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Neb. 687, 269 N.W. 623 (1936); Feurt v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 178 Minn. 395, 227 N.W. 212 (1929).
180 Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U.S. 147, 45 S.Ct. 33 (1924); Southern R. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313, 52 S.Ct. 518 (1932); St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Simpson, 286 U.S.
346, 52 S.Ct. 520 (1932); Bradley v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co., (9th Cir. 1930), 44 F.
(2d) 683; Van Derveer v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., (2d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 979;
Southern R. Co. v. Hylton, (6th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 843, affd. in Hylton v. Southern
R. Co., (6th Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 393; Paster v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1930)
43 F. (2d) 908.
181 "One of these (problems] was the application of the 'primary duty rule' in which
contributory negligence through violation of a company rule became assumption of risk.
Unadilla Valley Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139; Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U.S. 147••••
It was this maze of law which Congress swept into discard with the adoption of the 1939
amendment to the Employers' Liability Act, releasing the employee from the burden of
assumption of risk by whatever name it was called." Justice Black, in Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 at 63-64, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).
182 Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. R. Co., (6th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 654, cert. den. 332
U.S. 763, 68 S.Ct. 67 (1947). Accord: Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mangum, 250 Ala.
431, 34 S. (2d) 848 (1948); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Webb, (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) 229 S.W. (2d) 204; Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co., 60 Cal. App. (2d) 814, 142 P.
(2d) 37 (1943). Contra: Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Arnold, (8th Cir. 1947)
160 F. (2d) 1002; Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 772;
Kum v. Reese, 192 Okla. 78, 133 P. (2d) 880 (1943). See note, 62 Yale L.J. 111 (1952).
183 See text supra at note 36.
11s
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negligence has not contributed "proximately" at all. This has been
true under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,184 the various state
statutes where the question has been considered,1 85 and most of the
Canadian apportionment acts.186 The decisions may perhaps be justified, on the ground that the statutes all are silent on the last clear
chance, and the common law stands until it is clearly changed. But
the very probable reason for the silence is that the question simply
never occurred to the legislatures at all;187 and the result is that the
system of apportionment breaks down in an important group of cases,
where a loss from the fault of two parties still is visited entirely upon
one. Any necessity for the last clear chance as a palliation of the hardships of contributory negligence obviously disappears when the loss
can be apportioned; and the statute becomes jug-handled in favor of
the plaintiff, allowing the cases of injustice to the defendant to stand.188
This windfall to the plaintiff must inevitably be reflected in liability
insurance rates. At least, in any future statutes, there should be specific provision one way or the other as to the last clear chance, and it
should not be allowed, as in the past, to go by default.
Tennessee has developed, at common law, a peculiar rule under
which negligence of the plaintiff which contributes concurrently, or
184 Gray v. Southern R. Co., 167 N.C. 433, 83 S.E. 849 (1914), reversed on other
grounds in 241 U.S. 333, 36 S.Ct. 558 (1916); Soles v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 184
N.C. 283, 114 S.E. 305 (1922); Washington & O.D. R. Co. v. Weakley, 140 Va. 796,
125 S.E. 672 (1924); Barnes v. Red River & G. R. Co., 14 La. App. 188, 128 S. 724
(1930); Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 211 Iowa 924, 234 N.W. 810 (1931); St.
Louis & S.W. R. Co. v. Simpson, 184 Ark. 633, 43 S.W. (2d) 251 (1931), reversed on
other grounds in 286 U.S. 346, 52 S.Ct. 520 (1931); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Adams,
187 Ark. 816, 62 S.W. (2d) 947 (1933).
185 Seiffert v. Hines, 108 Neb. 62, 187 N.W. 108 (1922); Stanley v. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R. Co., 113 Neb. 280, 202 N.W. 864 (1925); Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. R. Co.,
129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935); Wilson's Admx. v. Virginia Portland R. Co., 122
Va. 160, 94 S.E. 347 (1917). An exception is Wisconsin, which did not recognize the last
clear chance. Switzer v. Detroit Investment Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925).
186 Walker v. Forbes, 27 O.W.N. 459, 56 Ont. L. Rep. 532, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 725;
Farber v. Toronto Transp. Co., 20 O.W.N. 464, 56 Ont. L. Rep. 537, [1925] 2 D.L.R.
729; Key v. British Columbia Elec. R. Co., 43 B.C. Rep. 288 (1930); Chambers v. Sampson, 44 B.C. Rep. 134 (1931); McLaughlin v. Long, [1927] Can. S.C. Rep. 303, [1927]
2 D.L.R. 186; Foster v. Kerr, [1940] 2 D.L.R. 47; Wilson v. Cline, [1946] 3 W.W.R. 353;
Carter v. Van Camp, [1930] Can. S.C. Rep. 156; McDonald v. Thomas, 41 Man. Rep.
657 (1933).
187 An exception is the British Act, where a Law Revision Commission reported recommending retention of the last clear chance. See Williams, ''The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act," 9 MoD. L. R:Ev. 105 at 126-130 (1946).
188 See Weir, "Davies v. Mann and Contributory Negligence Statutes," 9 CAN. B.
R:Ev. 470 (1931); MacDonald, "The Negligence Action and the Legislature," 13 CAN.
B. R:Ev. 535 (1935); MacIntyre, ''The Rationale of the Last Clear Chance," 53 HARv. L.
R:Ev. 1225 (1940); Williams, "The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act," 9 MoD.
L. REv. 105 (1946); Wright, ''The Law of Torts," 26 CAN. B. R:Ev. 46 at 70 (1948);
GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss D1sTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcnoNs 126-133 (1936).
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"proximately" or "directly" to his injury will bar all recovery,1 89 but if
his negligence is "remote" the damages will be reduced in proportion
to it.190 In its practical operation this has resulted in apportionment
only in cases where the defendant has the last clear chance. Georgia
has a statute191 providing that "if the plaintiff by ordinary care could
have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's
negligence, he is not entitled to recover"; and under the Georgia apportionment rule this has resulted in a reverse application of the last
clear chance, to the plaintiff instead of the defendant.192
Special Verdicts

All of these limitations merely cut down the scope of apportionment,
without going at all to the root of the difficulty, the unreliable and
irresponsible jury. A more realistic approach to that basic problem
is the procedure which requires a special verdict, or answers to special
interrogatories,1 93 bearing on the apportionment of damages. As this
procedure is applied to the apportionment issue in Wisconsin, for
example, the jury is not asked to return a general verdict for the
plaintiff with assessment of the recoverable damages, or for the defendant, but is asked instead a series of specific questions, which, with
their answers, might run in a typical case as follows:
1. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately
preceding the collision, was the defendant Smith negligent with
respect to the speed of his car? Yes.
189Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919); Anderson v. Carter, 22
Tenn. App. 118, 118 S.W. (2d) 891 (1938); Grigsby & Co. v. Bratton, 128 Tenn. 597,
163 S.W. 804 (1913); Memphis Street R. Co. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712, 81 S.W. 374
(1904); Hansard v. Ferguson, 23 Tenn. App. 306, 132 S.W. (2d) 221 (1939). There
is, however, a special rule apportioning the damages under the statute requiring certain
precautions of railroads. See supra, note 92.
190 Dush v. Fitzhugh, 2 Lea (70 Tenn.) 307 at 309 (1879); East Tenn. R. Co. v.
Fain, 12 Lea (80 Tenn.) 35 at 40 (1883); McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229
(2d) 505 (1950); Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919); Anderson v.
Carter, 22 Tenn. App. 118, 118 S.W. (2d) 891 (1938).
191 Ga. Code Ann. (1936) §105-603.
192Westem & A. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S.E. 306 (1901); Americus
R. Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S.E. 105 (1891); Pollard v. Heard, 53 Ga. App. 623, 186
S.E. 894 (1936); Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Stanley, 38 Ga. App. 773, 145 S.E. 530 (1928);
Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Larsen, 19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S.E. 517 (1917); Southern R. Co.
v. Wilbanks, (5th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 424; United States v. Fleming, (5th Cir. 1940)
115 F. (2d) 314.
193 Technically a special verdict requires answers to specific questions only on the
issues, without any general verdict for plaintiff or defendant. Special interrogatories are
asked in addition to the instruction to return a general verdict, and as a check upon the
jury's conclusions. Either may be appropriate to the apportionment of damages.
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2. If you answer Question 1 "Yes," then answer this: Was
the defendant Smith's negligence a cause of the collision? Yes.
3. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately
preceding the collision, was the plaintiff Jones negligent with
respect to failure to stop before entering the intersection? Yes.
4. If you answer Question 3 ''Yes," then answer this: Was
the plaintiff Jones's negligence a cause of the collision? Yes.
5. If you answer all of Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 ''Yes," then
answer this: What percentage of the total negligence was attributable to the defendant Smith? 60%. To the plaintiff Jones?
40%.
6. What is the amount of the damages plaintiff Jones has
sustained? $10,000.
With the information thus given, the court is in a position to
make the apportionment itself, and proceeds to enter judgment for the
plaintiff Jones in the amount of 60% of the damages found, or $6,000.
The jury are not told the effect of the answers, although they may
well understand what it will be; and it has been held to be error topermit counsel to read the apportionment statute to the jury in order
to let them know.194
Such is the Wisconsin procedure, which calls for a special verdict,
with the court making the final entry. Obviously, however, the same
questions would serve ~qually well as special interrogatories, put, along
with full instructions as to the law, as a check upon the jury's conclusions under the ordinary general verdict. And if, as has often been
the case in jurisdictions where all this is entirely unfamiliar, new and
alarming, even these few and simple questions appear unduly complicated and confusing, they might be made even simpler still. For
special interrogatories on the issue of division of damages, Questions 5
and 6 above are all that are really needed. Or the whole matter might
be reduced to the lowest possible terms, as follows:
Q. What is the full amount of the damages sustained by the
plaintiff? A. $10,000.
194 De Groot v. Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937). General instructions
are not given where the special verdict is used, and instructions on the special issues are
limited to those necessary or appropriate to enable the jury to understand the questions.
Connellee v. Nees, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 266 S.W. 502; Robertson & Mueller v. Holden;
(Tex. Comm. App. 1928) 1 S.W. (2d) 570; Tidal Western Oil Co. v. Blair, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) 39 S.W. (2d) 1103; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Bridges, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
39 S.W. (2d) 1109; Byington v. City of Merrill, 112 Wis. 211, 88 N.W. 26 (1901);
Banderob v. Wisconsin Cen. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 113 N.W. 738 (1907); Gendler v.
Cleveland R. Co., 18 Ohio App. 48 (1924).
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Q. What is the amount of plaintiff's damages as diminished
by reason of any negligence attributable to him? A. $6,000.195
Both special verdicts and special interrogatories have long been
authorized and permissible, either by statute or under the common
law, in nearly all of our jurisdictions.196 They have been discretionary
with the trial court, and actually they have been little used-seldom
requested by counsel, and more seldom given when asked. One reason
has been the traditional inertia of the bar toward any innovation in
procedure. Another was the unfortunate holding, in a few early cases
of special verdicts, that all controverted facts not found specifically
must be taken to be found against the party having the burden of
proof.107 Because of this, counsel, out of an excess of caution, began
to swamp the jury with detailed questions; and the special verdict
became so unwieldy, confusing and unworkable that complaints were
voiced by the courts.198 There were instances199 of appeals on a
record where thirty to fifty questions had been asked in a single case.
It was only when it was provided200 or held that facts not found spe195 This was done under the Wisconsin statute in Honore v. Ludwig, 211 Wis. 354,
247 N.W. 335 (1933), and was held to be proper. Padway, "Comparative Negligence,"
16 MAnQ. L. lli!v. 1 at 16-17, 23-24 (1931), gives this form of verdict and objects to
percentages under the Wisconsin act; but as the case cited indicates, percentage questions
are used almost universally in Wisconsin.
196 See generally, as to special verdicts and special interrogatories, Sunderland, ''Verdicts, General and Special," 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920); Morgan, "A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories," 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923); Wicker, "Special
Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases," 35 YALE L.J. 296 (1926); Green, "A New Development in Jury Trial," 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927); Staton, "The Special Verdict as an
Aid to the Jury," 13 J. AM. ]OD, Soc. 176 (1930); note, 34 ILI.. L. lli!v. 96 (1939);
Lipscomb, "Special Verdicts Under the Federal Rules," 25 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 185 (1940);
Dooley, "The Use of Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules," 20 Tax.
L. lli!v. 32 (1941); Nordbye, "Use of Special Verdicts Under Rules of Civil Procedure,"
2 F.R.D. 138 (1943); McCormick, "Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases,"
2 F.R.D. 176 (1943); Hyde, "Fact Finding by Special Verdict," 24 J. AM. •. Jun. Soc.
144 (1941); Rossman, "The Judge-Jury Relationship in the State Courts," 3 F.R.D. 98
(1944); Frank, "The Case for the Special Verdict," 32 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 142 (1949).
197Barnes v. Williams, 24 U.S. 415, 6 L. Ed. 508 (1826); Prentice v. Zane's Admrs.,
49 U.S. 470, 12 L. Ed. 1160 (1850); Graham v. Bayne, 59 U.S. 60, 15 L.Ed. 265
(1855); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 1 S.Ct. 307 (1882). This remains the rule in
many states, in the absence of special provision. Mulvaney v. Burroughs, 152 Iowa 439,
132 N.W. 873 (1911); Boulger v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632
(1918); Wilson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 15 S.D. 322, 89 N.W. 649 (1902); Hildman v. Phillips, 106 Wis. 611, 82 N.W. 566 (1900).
10s See Ward v. Busack, 46 Wis. 407, 1 N.W. 107 (1879); Texas Electric Service
Co. v. Anderson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 55 S.W. (2d) 142.
100 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Post, (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 62 S.W. 140 (50
questions); Oriental Inv. Co. v. Barclay, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 64 S.W. 80 (32 questions); St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. Jenkins, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 172 S.W. 984 (35
questions).
200 As in Wis. Stat. (1949) §270.28; Tex. Rev. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2190;
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a).
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cifically must be deemed to support the judgment if there was any
evidence to sustain it, that simplicity was restored and the special verdict gave satisfaction. Statutes in a few states now provide that the
court must submit special verdicts2°1 or special interrogatories202 at the
request of either party. In Wisconsin, North Carolina and Texas the
special issue has become standard procedure;203 and there is a history
of more than twenty years of its application to the Wisconsin general
apportionment act.204
When the apportionment provision of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act first reached the courts, some of them strongly recommended205 that the issue of the division of damages be put specially
to the jury, as a control upon the verdict and a remedy for the court's
ignorance of what the jury might do. In a few instances this was
done; 206 but it remained discretionary with the trial court,207 and for
201 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §11460; R.I. Laws (1938) c. 534, §2; Tex.
Rev. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2189; Wis. Stat. (1949) §270.27.
202 ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1923) c. 110, §79; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1914)
§572; Iowa Comp. Code (1919) §7253; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) c. 60, §2918; Mich. Comp.
L. (1915) §12611; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §11463; R.I. Gen. Laws (1923)
§4983.
2 03 The Texas procedure still has the reputation of creating confusion because of the
tendency of Texas attorneys to put complicated questions on over-refined niceties. See
Dooley, "The Use of Special Issues Under the State and Federal Rules," 20 True. L. REv.
32 (1941); McCormick, "Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases," 2 F. R.
D. 176 at 180 (1943); Rossman, "The Judge-Jury Relationship in the State Courts,'' 3
F.R.D. 98 at 109 (1944). McCormick says (p. 179) that in North Carolina "simplicity
and directness in the submission by questions to the jury is the key to the success of the
method,'' and that in Wisconsin the questions, although more numerous than in North
Carolina, "are apparently held within reasonable limits."
204 See, for example, Schulz v. General Cas. Co., 233 Wis. 118, 288 N.W. 803
(1939); Tomany v. Camozzi, 238 Wis. 611, 300 N.W. 508 (1941); Hom v. Snow-White
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 240 Wis. 312, 3 N.W. (2d) 380 (1942); Campanelli v.
Milwaukee Blee. R. & T. Co., 242 Wis. 505, 8 N.W. (2d) 390 (1943); Webster v. Roth,
246 Wis. 535, 18 N.W. (2d) 1 (1945).
2 os New York Cent. & H.R. R. Co. v. Banker, (2d Cir. 1915) 224 F. 351; McAuliffe
v. New York Cent. & H.R. R. Co., 172 App. Div. 597, 158 N.Y.S. 922 (1916). In the
last named case the court refers to this as "the more recently adopted method of returning
verdicts under this statute in the United States District Courts." (158 N.Y.S. at 927).
See also Wolf v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 239 App. Div. 95, 267 N.Y.S. 199 (1933).
206 Saar v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 97 Kan. 441, 155 P. 954 (1916); Kalashian v.
Hines, 171 Wis. 429, 177 N.W. 602 (1920); Richter v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.,
176 Wis. 188, 186 N.W. 616 (1922); Hanley v. Erie R. Co., 273 App. Div. 257, 77
N.Y.S. (2d) 153 (1948); Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Mix, (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) 193 S.W.
(2d) 542; Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., (Utah 1950) 213 P. (2d) 325. See also
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Pace, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 184 S.W. 1051, under
the Texas state railroad employers' liability act.
201 Refusal to put the special issue was held not to be error in Fried v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. R. Co., 183 App. Div. 115, 170 N.Y.S. 697 (1918), affd. in 230 N.Y.
619, 130 N.E. 917 (1921); Wolf v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 239 App. Div. 95, 267
N.Y.S. 199 (1933); Dallas Ry. & Term. Co. v. Sullivan, (5th Cir. 1940) 108 F. (2d)
581; Goodman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 289 ill. App. 320, 7 N.E. (2d) 393 (1937).
In the last named case the refusal was justified on the remarkable ground that the special
answer could not control the general verdict.
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no discernible reason other than pure inertia the practice never became
popular. When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided for
both special verdicts2° 8 and special interrogatories,200 they were still
left to the discretion of the judge, and they have had no apparent
effect upon cases arising under the act. 210 In 1948 Judge Frank, in a
characteristic opinion,211 copiously ornamented with footnotes, urged
vigorously and at length the use of the special issue in all such cases;
but there is as yet no indication that he has made many converts. There
has been no written opposition whatever to the procedure under the
Federal Rules, 212 and the failure of the federal courts to make use of
it in apportionment cases remains something of a mystery.
The advantages claimed for the special issue are many. 213 So
far as they are pertinent to the apportionment of damages, the most
208 Rule 49 (a): "Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other
brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method
of submitting the is~es and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the
matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If in so doing the· court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by
the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless
before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted
without such demand the court may make a finding or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed
to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict."
209 Rule 49 (b): "General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written
interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to
a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to
enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict,
and the court shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general
verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the court shall direct
the entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and the answers. When the
answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or may return the jury for further consideration of its
answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each
other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not
direct the entry of judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial."
210The special interrogatory procedure was used and upheld in Bolen v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 934. Refusal to put the special issue was held not to
be error in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 54.
2 11 Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 54. Judge
Learned Hand concurred briefly, as to the desirability of putting the special issue.
21 2 Driver, "A More Extended Use of the Special Verdict," 9 F.R.D. 495 (1950).
21 3 See Sunderland, "Verdicts, General and Special," 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920);
Wicker, "Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases," 35 YALE L.J. 296 (1926); Staton,
''The Special Verdict as an Aid to the Jury," 13 J. AM.. Jun. Soc. 176 (1930); Frank,
''The Case for the Special Verdict," 32 J. AM.. Jun. Soc. 142 (1949); Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 54.

502

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

important is of course that the jury is no longer given a free hand in
a cloak of secrecy, and the court is informed as to what it has done.
If the instructions have been thrown out of the window, if they have
been misunderstood, if there has been error in applying them, even
in arithmetic, it may be corrected rather than allowed to stand. The
court is told whether the jury has found contributory negligence at
all, whether it has divided the damages, and if so, in what proportion.
If the process or the result is wrong, a remittitur may save a complete
new trial. Beyond this, the jury is forced to give detailed consideration
to the issue, rather than to jump at a general conclusion without paying any attention to it. A jury which on general principles would
return a large verdict in favor of a pretty woman and against a railroad
company may well hesitate to return special findings which it knows
to be against the evidence. Finally, the special verdict may, in many
cases, avoid the necessity of long and complicated instructions,214 incomprehensible to anyone but a lawyer, and in themselves a fertile
source of error.
All of these advantages clearly operate in favor of the defendant
in the majority of apportionment cases, and the proposal for compulsory
special verdicts or special interrogatories has met with no enthusiasm
at all on the part of the plaintiffs' attorneys who usually introduce the
apportionment bills into the legislature. Yet the report of the Wisconsin
214 Staton, "The Special Verdict as an Aid to the Jury," 13 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 176 at
181 (1930), gives the following horrible example, which was one of several involved
instructions given in Payne v. Healey, 139 Md. 86, 114 A. 693 (1921): "The defendant
prays the court to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to look and listen for
approaching trains, as he approached the tracks of the defendant on the occasion of the
injuries complained of and to continue to look and listen until the said tracks were reached
and to further instruct the jury that if they shall find from the evidence that the view of
plaintiff of said tracks, as he then and there approached the same, was in either direction
in any way obstructed, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to stop, look and listen for
the approaching train or trains before attempting to cross the said tracks; and to further instruct the jury that if they shall further find that the plaintiff did not so look and listen,
or did not stop, look and listen, if they shall find that the view of the plaintiff of said tracks
was in either direction obstructed and shall further find that his failure to so look and
listen or to so stop, look and listen, directly contributed to the collision between the engine
and the defendant and the automobile which the plaintiff was then and there driving, then
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless the jury shall further find from the evidence
that the defendant, its agents or employees, in charge of the engine and train which collided with the automobile of the plaintiff could have by the exercise of reasonable care
and caution on his or their part, after he or they or any of them became aware of the
peril, the plaintiff had by his negligence, if the jury shall so find, placed himself, avoided
the consequences of the plaintiff's said negligence and prevented the injuries complained
of or unless they further find that the engineer in charge of said engine could by the
exercise of reasonable care have discovered the position or peril of the plaintiff while the
plaintiff was upon the Antietam street crossing and that the said engineer could by the
exercise of reasonable care have avoided injury to the plaintiff or his property after he
ought to have discovered the peril of the plaintiff if the jury so find."
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lawyers, for both plaintiffs and defendants, in response to inquiries
from drafting committees,215 has been for many years that the combination of the special issue procedure and the apportionment act has
worked very well in Wisconsin, that they regard the one as indispensable to the successful operation of the other, and that they would not
like to see a return to the common law.
particular, their report has
been that the increase in the number of recoveries which must inevitably result from the abrogation of the complete defense has been to a
considerable extent balanced and compensated by some reduction in the
size of verdicts, as juries apportion the damages instead of refusing to
find contributory negligence at all; and that liability insurance rates
have remained within reasonable bounds. Of the various possible
compromises, this seems to be the only one which is both reasonable
and effective.

In

Multiple Parties

Complications arise when apportionment involves multiple parties.
Where, for example, the automobiles of two negligent drivers collide
and injure the plaintiff, who is a bystander or a passenger in one of
the cars, it is obvious that no complete and substantial justice can be
done to the situation by any division of the damages between the plaintiff and one driver alone, in an action to which only those two are
parties. There remain the problems of evaluation of the contributing
fault of one who is not a party to the action, of the second suit against
him in which the first is not res judicata and a new jury may come to
a very different conclusion, and finally of contribution between the
joint tortfeasors. The only completely satisfactory method of dealing
2 15 The writer has seen some sixty such letters, in connection with the work of
drafting committees in Minnesota in 1939, and California in 1951.
"Another difficulty in the practical operation of the statute in Mississippi is that we
do not have special verdicts, but general lump-sum verdicts only. There is no way in which
it can be known, for instance, that the jury found that the plaintiff had been damaged
$1,000, that the plaintiff himself was guilty of 25 per cent of the negligence, and that the
jury awarded $750 for this reason. Thus, the appellate court has a most difficult time
in dealing with pleas of excessiveness or inadequacy.
"An automobile damage suit is usually a swearing contest. The appellate court has
no way of knowing whether the jury believed or disbelieved the testimony offered to establish that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. H the verdict seems to be unsually large
the court may assume that the jury did not believe that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence where that fact is in dispute when, as a matter of fact, the jury might not
have considered the comparative negligence statute at all in arriving at the verdict. We
have not had much experience with special verdicts, because there never has been any
provision for them in this state, but in our humble opinion a provision for special verdicts
should go along with a comparative negligence statute as one of the Siamese twins goes
along with the other." Lipscomb, "Comparative Negligence," lNs. L.J. No. 344, 667 at 673
(Sept. 1951).
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with the situation is to bring all the parties into court in a single action,
to determine the damages sustained by each, and to require that each
bear a proportion of the total loss according to his fault.
The English216 and some of the Canadian217 acts have proceeded
on this basis. With liberal procedure for joinder of parties at the instance of either plaintiff or defendant, as well as for counterclaims and
cross-complaints, they have provided for apportionment of all damages among all parties in proportion to their respective faults, including contribution between defendants. Professor Gregory, in a very
able book,218 has argued convincingly the superiority of these statutes
over any other existing acts. There can be no doubt that, from the
point of view of pure theory and abstract justice, they achieve a more
satisfactory result in cases of multiple parties than ever has been accomplished in the United States.
Practical operation is, however, a very .different thing from pure
theory; and it may well be questioned whether the very complex
Canadian procedure is capable of being adapted to the American jury.
The jury has virtually disappeared from tort litigation both in England and in Canada,219 and the success of the Canadian method has
· been due in no small part to its administration by very intelligent
judges. The cases of multiple parties can, and do, become extremely
involved, as is indicated by the very condensed statements of two of
them given by Professor Gregory: 220
I. Collision between I's automobile and M's truck, the truck
being parked on a highway at night with rear light on. I and I, Jr.
suffer damage of $283.10 and $200, respectively, and M's damage
was $35.75. I and I, Jr. sued M, who apparently counterclaimed
against I. I was found 25 per cent and M 75 per cent negligent.
Appeal by I and cross-appeal by M from judgment of trial court
dismissed. Court said damages were added, totaling $518.85, of
which I must bear 25 per cent and M 75 per cent. M pays I, Jr.
$200, and the balance of his share $189.13 to I, I pay nothing to
216 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c.
30; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. See WIL•
I.IAMS, JoINT ToRTS AND CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCB (1951).
217 In particular the statutes of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, supra note 9.
21s GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936). See
also Gregory, "Loss Distribution by Comparative Negligence,'' 21 MmN. L. REv. l (1936).
219 "In 1935, of some 1400 actions tried in the King's Bench in London, it is said
that about 300 were tried before juries. I have no Canadian statistics, but it is easy to
believe that the percentage of jury trials is even lower in Canada.'' O'Halloran, "Problems
in the Modern Appeal in Civil Cases," 27 CAN. B. REv. 259 at 263 (1949).
220 GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss D1sTIUBuTioN IN NEGLIGENCB ACTIONS 181, 186
(1936).
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M. The court apparently figured that M's share was¾ of $200,
plus¾ of $283.10, plus¾ of $35.75, and I's share¼ of this total,
in proportion to their negligence, and that I, Jr.'s recovery should
not be affected because he was not negligent at all.221
2. Collision of automobiles driven by GH and JW, belonging to HH and LW, respectively, accident occurring at a road
crossing. HH and LW, as owners, were responsible vicariously
under the Motor Vehicles Act for the negligence of their bailees.
GH and JW alone were negligent, being 1/3 and 2/3 negligent,
respectively.
PH's and SH's damages were $648 and $750 each, for which
they got judgment against LW. HH suffered $300 damages,
which she claimed by counterclaim against LW, she being entitled to 2/3 thereof, since the negligence of GH is attributed
to her as contributory negligence and as a basis of liability for
damages.
LW, under the statute, suffered $1,000 damages for loss of
services of his deceased wife and, in his personal capacity, $291.80.
The court held that inasmuch as the damages were for LW himself, they were to be reduced by 2/3 because of his responsibility
for JW's negligence, under the Motor Vehicles Act, both as contributory negligence and as a basis of liability for damages. LW
was also entitled to contribution from HH and GH of 1/3 of anything he paid to FH and SH.
It appeared that HH had added JW as a third party and filed
a cross-complaint for damages to her car. On this she was entitled
to judgment for 2/3 of her damages, just as she was on her contribution against LW.
GH and HH neglected to ask for contribution from JW to
anything they might have to pay to LW.
Net result:
FH against LW-$648
SH against LW-$750
HH against LW and JW-$200
LW against HH and GH-$861.20
LW against HH and GH-$466 as contribution (1/3 of
$648 plus $750)
If they had requested it, HH and GH might have had, as con- .
tribution from JW, $574.66, although [says Professor Gregory]
this is doubtful in view of the close domestic relationship involved.222
221The

case is Steele v. Ferguson, [1931] Ont. L. Rep. 427.
Williams, 47 B.C. Rep. 69 (1933).

222 The case is Haines v.
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It is one thing to say that a capable Canadian judge, with ample
time in chambers and a transcript of the record before him, can work
aII this out and do what the law requires. It is quite another to say that
it can be done in a limited time, and from memory by the twelve housewives, baker's helpers and unemployed individuals who make up the
kind of jury we get today in the United States. Even more terrifying
is the prospect of the instructions which must be given, under pressure
of time, before the jury retires, covering in detail all of the complications and replete with the possibility of reversible error. Even if
special issues are to be used, they must run to a number and complexity
which may weII break the whole process down under its own weight.
It has been the writer's experience that the mere attempt to explain to
a committee of a legislature, or even a bar association, just how the
Canadian method operates in cases of multiple parties, results in something approaching migraine and a general exodus for restoratives. It
is not surprising that, even with enthusiastic reports of complete success in Canada for more than a quarter of a century, no American
legislature has looked with favor upon such a system.223
An additional reason for hesitation here is the history of the Uniform Contribution Among T ortfeasors Act. Since its promulgation
by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1939, it has been adopted
in only nine jurisdictions;224 and so much opposition to it has developed
that the Commissioners now have withdrawn it for further study and
possible redrafting. The chief difficulty has been that of the release
of one tortfeasor, which under the terms of the act leaves him stilI liable
for contribution to the other, but credits him with a pro rata share of
his settlement. The defendants complain, with apparent justice, that
this makes it impossible ever to settle a case, take a release, and close
the £.le.225 Whatever the fate of the act may be, it is at least a warning
that contribution among tortfeasors introduces problems of its own,
and that the attempt to combine it with "comparative negligence" may
weII be the kiss of death to the whole bill.
223 The only serious attempt to persuade an American legislature to adopt the Canadian system was made in Minnesota in 1940. See PnocEEDINGS OF l.\1rnmisOTA STATE BAR
AssN. 12-17 (1940).
224 Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and South Dakota. Maryland and Pennsylvania modified or eliminated the
procedure provided by the act for joinder of third parties. Delaware, almost immediately
after adoption of the act, amended it limiting its application to joint judgment defendants.
225 See Larson, "A Problem in Contribution-The Tortfeasor with an Individual Defense Against the Injured Party," [1940] Wis. L. REv. 467; Smith, "Auto AccidentsContribution and Covenants Not to Sue," [1950] Wis. L. REv. 684; Barrett, "Release of
One Joint Tortfeasor Under Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," 18 lNs.
Counsel J. 100 (1951).
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Actually there are astonishingly few cases in which the question of
multiple parties has reached the appellate courts under any "comparative negligence" act. The writer has found only ten, all of them
arising in Georgia and Wisconsin, where apportionment is restricted
to cases in which the negligence of the plaintiff is ''less" than that of
the defendant. In none of these cases has the result been very satisfactory. In four of them226 it was held that the statute did not affect
contribution between joint tortfeasors, which under the Wisconsin common law rule must be on a basis of equality rather than in proportion
to fault. In four others227 it was held that the plaintiff could recover
nothing against one defendant whose fault was no greater than his
own; and that his recovery against the other defendant must be reduced in the proportion that the plaintiff's negligence bore to the total
of all three, rather than as between the two. In the ninth case,228
where the plaintiff's negligence was found to be 5%, that of one defendant 20%, and that of the other defendant 75%, it was held that
the plaintiff could recover 95% of his damages against both defendants,
with no apportionment between the two. In the tenth,229 where the
fault of the plaintiff was found to be 50%, and that of each of two defendants 25%, the plaintiff was denied all recovery, but each defendant
recovered 75% of his damages on his counterclaim.
It may be observed in passing that, however these results might
be improved, they are at least no worse than the common law would
have accomplished without the statute, by denying all recovery and
leaving the entire loss with the plaintiff. But the real significance of
these cases is not in their imperfections, but in their remarkably small
number. The explanation does not lie entirely in the fact that apportionment acts covering railroads and employers usually leave only
one possible defendant, since in Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Georgia and Wisconsin the apportionment applied to automobile accidents and other negligence cases. Nor does it lie in the absence of
procedure for joinder of parties, which is available in all these jurisdictions. The fact appears to be that the cases of multiple parties are
sufficiently few in number, or are disposed of with so little difficulty in
the trial courts, that they have not been a major problem on appeal.
226 Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 354, 244 N.W. 633 (1932); Zurn v. Whatley, 213
Wis. 365, 251 N.W. 435 (1933); Homerding v. Pospychalla, 228 Wis. 606, 280 N.W.
409 (1938); Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 282 N.W. 606 (1938).
227Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934);
Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W. (2d) 3 (1952); Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga. App.
700, 14 S.E. (2d) 187 (1941); Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E. (2d)
90 (1948).
22s Bohlmann v. Penn Electric Corp., 232 Wis. 232, 286 N.W. 552 (1939).
220 Kirchen v. Tisler, 255 Wis. 208, 38 N.W. (2d) 514 (1949).
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Conclusion

No effort has been made in these pages to argue the desirability
of the division of damages in contributory negligence cases. It speaks
for itself, and the question always has been one of feasibility rather
than of justice. It is too late, in the light of the long history, the many
statutes, and the multitude of cases, to contend that the thing cannot be
done at all. The chief problem is one of some protection for the defendants, and some restraint upon the irresponsible jury, which will
keep it within bounds and insure that the apportionment will in fact
be made.
If the writer were to attempt to draw an act for a legislature, he
would avoid "slight" and "gross" negligence, and the "lesser" negligence of the plaintiff, as the pestilence. They do not strike at the root
of the difficulty; they leave the damages undivided in too many cases
where the division should be made; and they lead inevitably to many
difficult appeals abounding in confusion. He would leave the multiple
party apportionment, theoretically perfect as it may be, to the Canadians
until the American jury is eliminated or at least improved, for the
reason that the game is not worth the candle. He would rely upon the
Wisconsin special issue procedure, or something like it, to keep the jury
under control.
The following draft, which follows closely a bill approved by the
California State Bar Association at its annual meeting in September,
1952, is consistent with these conclusions:
I. In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting
in personal injury or wrongful death or injury to property, including those in which the defendant has had the last clear chance
to avoid the injury, the contributory negligence of the person
injured, or of the deceased, or of the owner of the property, or of
the person having control over the property, shall not bar a recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the injured person or
to the deceased or to the owner of the property or to the person
having control over the property.
2. In any action to which section I of this act applies, the
court shall make findings of fact or the jury shall return a special
verdict which shall state:
(a) the amount of the damages which would have been
recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(b) the extent to which such damages are diminished by
reason of such contributory negligence.

